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INTRODUCTION
Injuries from adverse drug reactions' have increased dramati-
cally in recent years. 2 This increase is largely attributable to the
changing nature of pharmaceutical products. First of all, more
pharmaceutical products are currently available to physicians than
ever in history. Presently, there are more than ten thousand pre-
scription drugs on the market, and each year four hundred to five
hundred new ones are introduced. 3 Second, modern drugs often
An adverse drug reaction is a harmful and undesirable response occurring at dosage
levels ordinarily appropriate for their intended purpose. See Bennett & Lipman, Comparative
Study of Prospective Surveillance and Voluntary Reporting in Determining the Incidence of
Adverse Drug Reaction, 34 Am. J. Hosp. PHARm. 931 (1977); Note, The Liability of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 FoaRDRAM L.
Rav. 735 (1980).
2 See Comment, Drug Products Liability: Duty to Warn, 49 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 283
(1987).
, See L. FRuYmR & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LBLurrY § 50.0111], at 50-6 (1987).
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are more potent than their older counterparts, thus increasing the
likelihood of adverse reactions.4
It should come as no surprise that this rise in the number of
drug-related injuries has led to a comparable increase in litigation.-
Unfortunately, the courts seem unable to agree on a consistent set
of liability rules to apply in drug injury cases. Sellers of defective
pharmaceutical products 6 are theoretically subject to strict liability,
just like other product sellers. However, in the case of pharmaceu-
tical products, the principle of strict liability is qualified by a special
rule for "unavoidably unsafe" products. According to this rule,
which is derived from comment k to section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, sellers of unavoidably unsafe products are
not held strictly liable to injured consumers as long as. they warn
the consumers of reasonably discoverable risks.7
Because comment k is unclear in many respects,8 there is con-
siderable disagreement about its nature and scope. For example,
most courts have concluded that comment k essentially imposes a
negligence standard on product sellers. 9 Nevertheless, a few courts
seem to retain some vestiges of strict liability in comment k cases.1°
See Irvey, Validating Adverse Reaction Cases, 1 J. LEGAL MED. 49 (Sept.-Oct.
1973).
See Note, An Escape from Strict Liability: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Re-
sponsibility for Drug-Related Injuries Under Comment K to Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 23 DuQ. L. Ray. 199 (1984).
6 This Article uses the term "pharmaceutical products" to include chemical drugs,
biologics such as blood or vaccines, and medical devices that are sold through prescription.
Over-the-counter products are excluded from this definition, although many are produced
by the same companies that manufacture prescription drugs.
7RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1979).'
8 Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment K and for Strict Tort
Liability, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 853, 866 (1983) ("Comment k ... failed to delineate ...
either the breadth of its coverage or its purpose."); Comment, Comment K Immunity to
Strict Liability: Should All Prescription Drugs Be Protected?, 26 Hous. L. REv. 707, 721
(1989) (confusion in drug-related application stems from the conflict between comment k
and the purposes underlying 402A).
9 See Plummer v. Lederle Laboratories, 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305, 1318 (N.J. Super.
1980); Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 345-46
(1974); Mobilia, Allergic Reactions to Prescription Drugs: A Proposal for Compensation,
48 ALB. L. REv. 343, 345 (1983-84).
10 Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories; 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1496 (D. Kan. 1987) ("[C]omment
k ... [does not stand] for the rule that all prescription drugs are unavoidably unsafe as a
matter of law."); Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 464-65 (1985) (discussing
plaintiff's ability to prosecute her case under a strict liability theory); Toner v. Lederle
Laboratories, 732 P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987) ("We do not believe comment k was intended
to provide nor should it provide all ethical drugs with blanket immunity from strict
liability .... "); Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1323 (Kan. 1986),
aff'd, 758 P.2d 206 (1988).
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The courts also disagree about whether comment k applies to
pharmaceutical products across the board or only on a case-by-
case basis."
The debate over comment k, however, is not limited to ques-
tions of interpretation. At a more basic level, it also involves a
conflict over the proper liability standard to be imposed on sellers
of pharmaceutical products. Critics of comment k argue that no
group of product sellers should be subjected to a lesser standard
of liability simply because of the products they sell. 2 In their view,
consumers of pharmaceutical products should be entitled to the
same legal protection as consumers of any other products. 3
However, advocates of limited liability maintain that strict
liability rules are best suited to mechanical products and cannot be
applied willy-nilly to chemical or biological products, such as phar-
maceuticals.' 4 Proponents of comment k also contend that strict
liability would have an undesirable adverse effect on the availability
and price of pharmaceutical products. 15
This Article discusses the role that comment k should play in
the law of products liability. Part I reviews the fundamentals of
strict products liability and examines the basic features of comment
" Compare cases holding that the court should determine the applicability of comment
k on an individual basis: Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (8th Cir.
1989); Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 779 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986); Feldman v.
Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1984); White v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,
533 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio 1988) with cases holding that comment k applies to prescription
drugs as a class: McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. Supp. 228, 230 (D.S.D. 1983);
Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D. Md. 1980); Brown v.
Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482 n.11 (1988).
,2 See Note, supra note 5, at 218.
" Justice Traynor described the inadequacy of existing legal protection for consumers
of health care products in the following words: "Thus ill health offers adventure; no one
has a better chance to live dangerously than those who must take their medicine." See
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L.
REv. 363, 368 (1965).
14 See Pratt & Parson, Diagnosis of a Legal Headache: Liability for Unforeseeable
Defects in Drugs, 53 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 517, 519-21 (1978-79) (discussing how pharmaceu-
tical products differ from machines).
11 See Comment, The Diminishing Role of Negligence in Manufaturers' Liability for
Unavoidably Unsafe Drugs and Cosmetics, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 102, 110 (1977) (strict liability
may discourage pharmaceutical companies from marketing new products); see also Epstein,
The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1204 (1986) (fear of
excessive tort liability caused DTP vaccine manufacturers to withdraw their products from
the market); Note, supra note 8, at 718 (fear of increased tort liability caused price of DTP
vaccine to rise from 11 cents per dose in 1982 to $11.40 per dose in 1986, of which $8.00
was allocated to an insurance reserve).
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k. 6 Part II identifies four types of product risks and discusses how
each is treated under comment k's liability rules.17 These risks
include: (1) risks associated with the production process, (2) risks
arising from a product's inherent nature or chemical composition,
(3) risks created by particular design choices, and (4) scientifically
unknowable risks.
Part III is concerned with the proper function of comment k
in modern products liability law. 8 The first section compares the
liability of pharmaceutical product sellers under both strict liability
and comment k.' 9 The next section reviews the various rationales
that courts have relied upon to support the imposition of strict
liability on product sellers.20 This leads to the conclusion that strict
liability is appropriate when consumers are harmed by production
flaws and perhaps by product design, but not when their injuries
are caused by some aspect of a product's inherent nature or chem-
ical composition. The third section evaluates the merits of a hind-
sight rule in connection with the duty to warn.2' The final section
proposes a version of comment k that is consistent with the policies
underlying strict products liability.Y
I. OVERVIEW
A. Strict Products Liability
Strict liability, as codified in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 23 has now largely replaced negligence and im-
16 See infra notes 23-77 and accompanying text.
'7 See infra notes 78-186 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 187-343 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 191-217 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 218-92 and accompanying text.
'1 See infra notes 293-328 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 329-43 and accompanying text.
2 Section 402A provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
1989-90]
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plied warranty as the preferred theory of recovery against product
sellers. 24 Under strict liability, the focus is on the product's con-
dition, not the manufacturer's conduct. 21 Consequently, if a prod-
uct is defective, an injured party can recover without showing
that a manufacturer failed to exercise due care in the manufacture
or design of the product. 26
However, strict liability is not absolute liability, 27 nor does it
require manufacturers to insure against all product-related inju-
ries. 28 Section 402A requires that a product be "defective" for
there to be liability.2 9 This means that something must be "wrong"
The triumph of strict liability in tort over negligence and implied warranty in the
law of products liability is recounted in Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1965-66).
25 See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 883 (Alaska 1979); West v.
Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 451 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 824 (1986); Jackson v. Harsco Corp., 673 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1983); Kerns v.
Engelke, 390 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ill. 1979); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955,
958 (Md. 1976); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wash. 1984).
6 See Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 544 A.2d 357, 372 (N.J. 1988); Ulmer v.
Ford Motor Co., 452 P.2d 729, 735 (Wash. 1965). See generally Albanese v. Emerson Elec.
Co., 552 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D. Del. 1982).
" See Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 P.2d 750, 754 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)
("Strict liability ... cannot be equated with absolute liability."); Vineyard v. Empire Mach.
Co., Inc., 581 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) ("[S]trict liability is not synonymous
with absolute liability."); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 353 (Haw. 1982)
("Strict products liability was never intended to be absolute liability."); Prentis v. Yale
Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 181 (Mich. 1984) ("[Courts] have never gone so far as to make
sellers ... absolutely liable for any and all injuries sustained from the use of those
products."); Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 352 A.2d 723, 724 (N.H. 1976) ("Sellers are not...
subject to absolute liability."); Williamette Essential Oils, Inc. v. Herrold & Jensen Imple-
ment Co., 683 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) ("Strict liability is not absolute
liability .... "); Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 280 N.E.2d 226, 231 (Wis. 1979) ("Strict
liability does not ... impose absolute liability.").
11 See Gray v. Manitowac Co., Inc., 771 F.2d 866, 868-69 (5th Cir. 1985); Laney v.
Coleman Co., Inc., 758 F.2d 1299, 1302 (8th Cir. 1985); Giordano v. Ford Motor Co., 299
S.E.2d 897, 899 (Ga. 1983); Coney v. J.L.G. Ind., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 200 (Ill. 1983);
Hunt v. Blasius, 384 N.E.2d 368, 372 (Ill. 1978); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d
182, 188 (Ill. 1965).
29 Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts appears to require that a product
be both defective and unreasonably dangerous for strict liability to apply. However, a
growing number of courts now regard the "unreasonably dangerous" concept as unnecessary
baggage and reject it as a requirement for strict liability. See M. SHAPo, THE LAw oF
PRODucTs LiABiry 8.08 (1987); see also Butand v. Surburban Marine & Sporting Goods,
Inc., 543 P.2d 209, 214 (Alaska 1975) ("[Requiring] plaintiff to prove that the product was
unreasonably dangerous is burdensome and represents a step backward in this area.");
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62 (Cal. 1972) (requiring plaintiffs to
prove that products are unreasonably dangerous burdens them "with proof of an element
that rings of negligence."); Boudreau v. General Elect. Co., 625 P.2d 384, 389 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1981); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 153 (N.J. 1979);
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with the product.30 A manufacturing defect arises from some
mishap in the production process, 3' while a design defect exists
when the entire product line shares a common dangerous char-
acteristic.32 Additionally, strict liability may be imposed on a
product seller who fails to provide adequate instructions or warn-
ings.33
No single definition of defect can cover every type of danger-
ous condition in a product.3 4 Therefore, most courts use several
approaches depending on the circumstances involved. For exam-
ple, under the "deviation from the norm" test, 35 a product that
deviates from the manufacturer's intended design or that is infe-
rior to products of the same description is considered defective.3 6
Another definition, known as the consumer expectation test,
looks to the expectations of the ordinary consumer.37 Under this
Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (Pa. 1978) ("[T]he term 'unreasonably
dangerous' has no place in the instructions to a jury ...... "); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter
Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 899-900 (Pa. 1975) ("We hold today that the reasonable man standard
in any form has no place in a strict liability case.").
" See Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1211 (N.D. Tex. 1985); see also
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design
of Products, 20 SYRAcusE L. Rv. 559, 566 (1968-69).
"1 See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design: From Negligence [to Warranty] to
Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 599 (1980) ("Manufacturing defects
.. may be evaluated against the manufacturer's own production standards, as manifested
by other like products that roll off the assembly line."); Maynard & Crisci, The Duty to
Warn in "Toxic Tort" Litigation, 33 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 69, 70 (1984-85).
"1 For a discussion of design defects, see Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law
of Products Liability, 28 DRAc L. REv. 317, 345-47 (1978-79); Powers, The Persistence of
Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L. REv. 777, 782 (1982-83).
11 See Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 551, 551-52 (1980).
"4 See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443, 453, (Cal. 1978); O'Brien v.
Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. 1983).
1, See Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 772, 482 P.2d 681, 684 (Cal.
1971); see also Caterpillar Tractor Co., 593 P.2d at 881. The deviation from the norm test
is derived from the implied warranty of merchantability. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-314(2)(d) ("Goods to be merchantable must be ... of even kind, quality and quantity
within each unit and among all units involved . . ").
36 For a discussion of the "deviation from the norm" test, see Traynor, supra note
13, at 367.
"1 See Boy v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 P.2d 612, 620 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Dunham
v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ill. 1969); Hancock v. Paccar,
Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25, 37 (Neb. 1979); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353,
1362-63 (Okla. 1974); Tinderman v. Fleetwood Homes, 684 P.2d 1302, 1305 (Wash. 1984);
Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 587 P.2d 160, 163-64 (Wash. 1978).
The consumer expectation test also is based on warranty principles, See Fischer, supra
note 9, at 348; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Torts Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 833-34 (1973).
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approach, a product is defective if it is more dangerous than an
ordinary consumer would expect it to be. 38 The consumer expec-
tation test does not require a product to be risk-free; 39 rather, it
is concerned with protecting buyers against unexpected product
risks .40
A third definition of defect, often used in design defect cases,
is concerned with the product's risks and benefits. This approach
balances the risks and benefits of the product as designed with
the risks and benefits of an alternative (and less risky) design
proposed by the plaintiff. The product is considered defective if
the overall utility of the alternative design exceeds that of the
product's existing design.4'
B. Comment K and "'Unavoidably Unsafe" Products
Comment k is something of an anomaly in the law of products
liability. It provides that strict liability will not apply to the sale
of a product that is incapable of being made safe for its intended
use as long as its utility outweighs its apparent risks and a proper
warning is given. 42 Such products are characterized as "unavoid-
38 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1979).
" See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 16 (1965) ("Strict
products liability clearly does not require a perfectly safe product.").
,0 See Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42
IND. L.J. 301, 306 (1966-67).
11 See Suter, 406 A.2d at 150-51; Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 454;
Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1026; Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Or.
1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979); see also Hen-
derson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preser-
vation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773, 773-78 (1978-79).
41 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k, declares:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs.
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies,
which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when
it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both
the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding
the unavoidably high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not
defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this reason cannot legally be
sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also
true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be
no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such
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ably unsafe." According to comment k, unavoidably unsafe prod-
ucts are neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous, even though
they cause injury.43
Comment k does not define the term "unavoidably unsafe
product," but instead gives a number of examples." The first is
the Pasteur vaccine, a product that provides protection against
rabies, but occasionally causes harmful side effects .4  The second
category includes "drugs, vaccines, and the like" that are suffi-
ciently dangerous that they can be sold only by prescription. 6
The third group consists of "new or experimental" drugs that are
potentially dangerous because "lack of time and opportunity for
sufficient medical experience" preclude the seller from providing
any assurance of safety.47
Since all of the examples enumerated in comment k involve
pharmaceutical products, one may reasonably conclude that the
experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstand-
ing a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and propeK warn-
ing is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has un-
dertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product,
attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
4 See Mobilia, supra note 9, at 344; Note, Mass Immunization Cases: Drug Manu-
facturers' Liability for Failure to Warn, 29 VArN. L. Ray. 235, 245 (1976).
14 See Gershonowitz, The Strict Liability Duty to Warn, 44 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
71, 87 (1987) (proposing that comment k provides for a form of quasi strict liability).
41 See Comment, Torts-Strict Liability-A Hospital is Strictly Liable for Transfu-
sions of Hepatitis, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1172, 1182 (1971).
41 Federal law requires that any medicine with toxic effects that render it unsafe for
self-medication must be sold under prescription. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(B) (1982).
4' This last example actually includes two distinct categories of drugs. "Experimental"
drugs are products that are still undergoing clinical testing and are not available to the
general public even under prescription. See Note, supra note 1, at 753-55 (discussion of
FDA clinical testing procedures). These products have not really entered the stream of
commerce, and it is questionable whether section 402A would apply to drug test subjects.
Liability, if any, probably would be based on a theory of informed consent; this theory
turns on whether the manufacturer or treating physician failed to provide test subjects with
adequate information about potential risks.
The term "new drug," on the other hand, is a term of art used for regulatory purposes.
At the time comment k was drafted, a new drug was defined by statute as one "not
generally recognized as ... safe." See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 931-32 (Cal. 1980). A new drug could be marketed only after a new drug
application was submitted to the FDA and approved by that agency. Once the FDA
determined that a product generally was recognized as safe, it would no longer classify it
as a new drug. Other manufacturers could then market such products without submitting
an application to the FDA. Id. Although federal regulations have changed significantly since
the 1960's, the statutory definition of a new drug is the same as it was when comment k
was first drafted in 1961. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1982).
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drafters intended to limit the scope of this provision to drugs,
vaccines, and similar products. 48 Moreover, this interpretation is
amply supported by existing case law. Most comment k cases have
involved either chemical drugs, 49 antibiotics,50  vaccines,51
See Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Reasoning and Policy
Behind Comment K, 42 WAsH. & LE L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1985).
" See Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Fentanyl); De Luryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 229 (8th Cir. 1983) (Talwin);
Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1981) (oral contra-
ceptive); Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 384, 402 (7th Cir. 1981) (Denos-
trol); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980) (oral
contraceptive); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425 (2d Cir. 1969) (Chloroquine);
Raynor v. Richardson.Merrell, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 238, 247 (D.D.C. 1986) (Bendectin);
Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (Bendectin);
Muniz Nunez v. American Home Prod. Corp., 582 F. Supp. 459, 462 (D. P.R. 1984)
(Inderal); Fellows v. USv Pharmaceutical Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D. Md. 1980)
(Doriden); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. Supp. 22, 23 (D.S.D. 1983), aff'd, 739
F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984) (DES); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 161-62
(D.S.D. 1967) (Chloroquinine); Brown v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. Rptr. 768, 774 (Ct. App.
1986), aff'd, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (DES); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 150 Cal. Rptr.
73Y, 736 (Ct. App. 1979) (DES); Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 399-400 (Ct. App.
1971) (oral contraceptive); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 412 (Ct.
App. 1967) (Triparanol); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 415-16
(Colo. 1986) (oral contraceptive); Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1107 (Colo. 1976)
(oral contraceptive); Woodhill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (Ill. 1980)
(Pitocin); Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 356 N.E.2d 779, 782-83 (Ill. 1976) (oral contra-
ceptive); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 545 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979) (oral contraceptive); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 117 (Iowa 1986) (oral
contraceptive); McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 241 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Neb. 1976)
(Innovar); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305, 1319 (N.J. 1980) (DES); Davila v.
Bodelson, 704 P.2d 1119, 1127-28 (N.M. App. 1985) (Pitocin); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
423 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ohio 1981) (oral contraceptive); Vaughn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 536
P.2d 1247, 1248 (Or. 1975) (oral contraceptive), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); Cochran
v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904, 906-07 (Or. 1966) (Chloroquinine); Lewis v. Baker, 413 P.2d 400,
402-03 (Or. 1966) (Triparanol); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 307 A.2d 449,
457 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973) (oral contraceptive); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514
S.W.2d 429, 432-33 (Tex. 1974) (Talwin); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp.
377, 380-81 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977) (oral contraceptive). But see
Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984)
(comment k not applicable to DES).
0 See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1080 (1980) (cleocin); Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1977) (tetracycline);
Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J, 1984) (tetracycline); Wolfgruber
v. Upjohn Co., 72 A.D.2d 59, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1979) (cleocin); Incollingo v. Ewing,
282 A.2d 206, 220 (Pa. 1971) (chloromycetin).
1' See Plummer v. Lederle Laboratories, 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1987) (oral polio
vaccine); Petty v, United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1439 (8th Cir. 1984) (swine flu vaccine);
Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1984) (swine flu vaccine); Givens
v. Lederle Laboratories, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977) (oral polio vaccine); Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir. 1974) (oral polio vaccine); Alman Brothers
Farm & Feed Mill, Inc. v. Diamond Laboratories, Inc., 437 F.2d 1295, 1302 (5th Cir. 1971)
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blood,52 or medical devices. 53 Although it has been suggested that
other products may also merit comment k protection,54 the courts
generally have refused to extend comment k to nonmedical products.5
(hog cholera vaccine); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1968)
(oral polio vaccine); Williams v. Lederle Laboratories, 591 F. Supp. 381, 384 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (oral polio vaccine); Sheehan v. Pima County, 660 P.2d 486, 487 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) (oral polio vaccine); Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463 (Ct. App.
1985) (oral polio vaccine); Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1323 (Kan.
1986) (oral polio vaccine); Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories, 328 N.W.2d 576, 579 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982) (oral polio vaccine); White v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 754
(Ohio 1988) (DTP vaccine); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., 532 P.2d 1377,
1380 (Okla. 1974) (oral polio vaccine); Calabrese v. Trenton State College, 392 A.2d 600,
604 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 413 A.2d 315 (1980) (Pasteur rabies vaccine); Samuels v.
American Cyanamid 'Co., 130 Misc. 2d 175, 495 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1011 (1985) (tetanus-
typhoid-cholera vaccine).
11 See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 125-26 (Colo.
1983) (blood); McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Ky. 1975) (blood);
Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 371 A.2d 105, 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977) (blood);
Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 527 P.2d 1075, 1076-77 (N.M. 1974) (blood).
" See Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1985) (IUD);
Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1230 (4th Cir. 1984) (cardiac pacemaker); Collins
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr. 396, 405-06 (1986) (IUD); Racer v. Utterman,
629 S.W.2d 387, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (antibacterial surgical drape); Perfetti v. McGhan
Medical, 662 P.2d 646, 649-50 (N.M. Ct. App.) (mammary prosthesis), cert. denied, 662
P.2d 645 (N.M. 1983); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 24 (Okla. 1982) (IUD); Terhune v.
A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 977 (Wash. 1978) (IUD).
'4 See Phillips, supra note 32, at 357 (the unavoidably unsafe doctrine may be applied
broadly to any socially useful product that cannot be made safe).
" See Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (golf
carts not unavoidably unsafe because they can be made safe for their intended use); Netzel
v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 186 N.W.2d 258, 264 (Wis. 1971) (ordinary concrete mix not
unavoidably unsafe merely because it contained caustic ingredients); see also Filler v. Rayex
Corp., 435 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1970) (baseball sunglasses might be unavoidably unsafe,
but manufacturer held liable anyway for failure to warn that glasses were not shatterproof);
Wilkinson v. Bay Shore Lumber Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 327, 332-33 (Ct. App. 1986) (lumber
may be an unavoidably unsafe product but defendant failed to produce sufficient evidence
of this at trial); Walker v. Stuffer Chem. Corp., 96 Cal. Rptr. 803, 606 (1971) (sulfuric
acid is a useful and desirable product that cannot be made entirely safe for its intended
use).
Some courts have acknowledged that comment k might be applicable, at least in
theory, to asbestos products. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 516
(5th Cir. 1984) (asbestos products may qualify as unavoidably unsafe); Moran v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 1982) (asbestos products may qualify as
unavoidably unsafe); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (some commercial products in addition to drugs
might be deemed unavoidably unsafe if they possess both unparalleled utility and unques-
tioned danger); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 372 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (asbestos products may qualify as unavoidably unsafe); Daniels v. Combustion Eng'g,
Inc., 583 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tenn. App. 1978) (asbestos products may qualify as unavoidably
unsafe),
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At the same time, most courts have refused to characterize
every pharmaceutical product as unavoidably unsafe; instead, they
have chosen to evaluate each pharmaceutical product on a case-
by-case basis.5 Theoretically, a product risk must be "unavoida-
ble" for comment k to apply. This means that the risk must be
inherent in the nature of the product and incapable of being
eliminated by the application of existing technology. Additionally,
the benefits of the product must outweigh its apparent risks . 7
There is a superficial resemblance between comment k's risk-utility
analysis and the approach employed in product design cases. In
comment k cases, however, courts apparently seldom engage in a
careful in-depth analysis of a product's risks and benefits." In-
stead, courts generally assume that the therapeutic benefits of drugs
and vaccines outweigh the risks associated with their use. Further-
more, in contrast with the usual practice in product design cases,
courts tend to treat the risk-utility issue in comment k cases as a
matter of law rather than leaving it to the jury to decide.
Even if a product's utility outweighs its risks, the product seller
also must warn about known risks and will be held strictly liable
if it fails to do so. 59 Generally speaking, the scope of the duty to
warn is the same for producers of unavoidably unsafe products as
it is for other product sellers.6° Essentially, this means that a
1 Most courts maintain that the applicability of comment k to pharmaceutical prod-
ucts must be decided on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884
F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1989); Toner for Toner v. Lederle Labs., 779 F.2d 1429, 1433
(9th Cir. 1986); Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1496 (D. Kan. 1987);
Martinkovic v. Wyeth Laboratories, 669 F. Supp. 212, 216-17 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Feldman,
479 A.2d at 383; White, 533 N.E.2d at 752; Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 751
P.2d 215, 218 n.4 (Or. 1988); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I.
1988); Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 52.
A few courts, however, have concluded that prescription drugs as a class are covered
by comment k. See McElhaney, 575 F. Supp. at 230; Fellows, 502 F. Supp. at 300; Brown,
751 P.2d at 482 n.11. Apparently, these courts feel that an independent assessment of risks
and benefits by the court is unnecessary in the case of prescription drugs because the FDA
evaluates risks and benefits of all drugs before allowing them to be marketed. See Collins,
231 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
7 The risks and benefits are evaluated in terms of what was known at the time of
marketing. See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 1144; Note, supra note 1, at 743.
58 See Burke, DPT Vaccine Controversy: An Assessment of the Liabilities of Manu-
facturers and Administering Physicians Under Several Legal Theories, 17 SEToN HALL L.
RaV. 541, 558 (1987).
19 See Brochu, 642 F.2d at 658-59; Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1282; Singer v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 461 F.2d 288, 290-91 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972); Parke-Davis & Co.
v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390, 1401 (8th Cir. 1969); Samuels, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 1011.
10 A number of courts in comment k cases have relied expressly on the provisions of
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warning must be adequate with respect to factual content, expres-
sion, and method of communication. 6'
Adequacy in terms of content requires that a warning be fac-
tually accurate and complete.6 2 A product seller must disclose all
known risks63 and reveal the specific nature and magnitude of these
risks." Many courts have required sellers to warn only when a
"substantial" or "appreciable number" of consumers are poten-
tially affected by the dangerous condition. 65 However, in the case
of prescription drugs, the seller may be required to warn of a risk
even though it affects only a very small proportion of product
users."
comment j, which sets forth the general duty to warn under section 402A. See Needham,
639 F.2d at 402; McElhaney, 575 F. Supp. at 231-32; Brown, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 776;
Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 546.
11 See Brochu, 642 F.2d at 657; Graham, 666 F. Supp. at 1498; Finn v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 677 P.2d 1147, 1182 (Cal. 1984); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales,
561 S.W.2d 801, 823-24 ('rex. 1978); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1230
(Ill. Ct. App. 1979); Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 552; Seley, 423 N.E.2d at 837; McEwen v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974).
62 See Brochu, 642 F.2d at 658 (warning about risk of stroke from oral contraceptive
pill held to be inadequate because it failed to mention results of recent British study);
Alman Bros., 437 F.2d at 1302-03 (failure to warn that hog cholera vaccine might cause
cholera in healthy hogs); Rumsey v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387, 393 (rex.
Civ. App. 1968) (warning on roach poison inadequate because it failed to disclose that no
antidote existed); Racer, 629 S.W.2d at 394 (failure to warn about flammability of surgical
drape).
61 See Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669, 673-75 (D. Or. 1963) (warning
of danger of direct physical contact not sufficient to warn about danger from contact with
earth upon which product had been spilled); Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 18, 23-
24 (Mo. 1961) (warning that caustic drain cleaner was poisonous not adequate to warn that
blinding explosion might result if too much cleaner was poured down drain).
" See Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1984) (tampon
manufacturer held liable for failure to warn about risk of toxic shock syndrome); Reid v.
Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 253 S.E.2d 344, 349-50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (warning inadequate for
failure to disclose flammability risk of deodorant); Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 398
A.2d 132, 140 (N.J. Super. 1979) (direction on aspirin product to discontinue use if pain
persisted not sufficient to warn about risk of ulcer).
65 See Merrill v. Beute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1956); Mountain v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 312 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Skaggs v. Clairol, Inc.,
85 Cal. Rptr. 584, 587 (Ct. App. 1970); Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural Chemicals, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 709, 713-14 (Ct. App. 1969) (manufacturer of weed killer not liable unless it knew
that substantial number of persons were allergic to product); Howard v. Avon Products,
Inc., 395 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1964); Bonkowski v. Revlon, Inc., 100 N.W.2d 5, 8 (Iowa 1959);
Alberto-Culver Co. v. Morgan, 444 S.W.2d 770, 776 (rex. Civ. App. 1969) (No liability
for injuries caused by allergic reaction to hair dye because manufacturer could not foresee
injury to "appreciable number" of product users.); Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 378 P.2d
298 (Wash. 1963).
" See Parke-Davis & Co., 411 F.2d at 1400; Davis, 399 F.2d at 129-30; Tomer v.
American Home Prod. Co., 368 A.2d 35, 40 (Conn. 1976); Cunningham, 532 P.2d at 1381;
McEwen, 528 P.2d at 529-30.
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The manner of expression also is relevant to the question of
adequacy. A warning must be communicated in language that is
clear and understandable. 67 For this reason, a warning couched in
technical language will not be appropriate when the intended recip-
ient is unlikely to comprehend its meaning. 68 A warning also must
be displayed so that it is readily visible.6 9 Additionally, a warning
must be phrased with sufficient emphasis to ensure that potential
users will exercise caution.70 However, a "watered down" warning
that minimizes dangers or contains misleading assurances of safety
will be considered inadequate. 71
Finally, the seller must ensure that its warnings will reach
anyone who may be endangered by the product. Normally, this
duty can be met only if the seller communicates a warning to the
ultimate user of the product. 72 However, where prescription drugs
are involved, warnings may be directed at the medical profession
rather than the ultimate users of such products .7  The rationale for
this rule is that lay persons often require the assistance of medical
personnel to interpret warnings and make informed decisions about
the risks of drug therapy. In addition, manufacturers, who typically
draft product warnings, would find it difficult to warn consumers
directly because prescription drugs are not sold to the general
67 See Seley, 423 N.E.2d at 837.
" See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 71-72 (Mass. 1985)
(reference to "cerebral thrombosis" not sufficient to warn users of oral contraceptive pills
about the danger of a stroke); Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Mo. 1958)
(statement that product contained calcium oxide not sufficient to warn of risk of blindness).
69 See Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23
Sw. L.J. 256, 284 (1969).
10 See Note, supra note 43, at 254-55; Note, Alternatives to Manufacturer Liability
for Injuries Caused by the Sabin-Type Oral Polio Vaccines, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 711,
725 (1986-87), Note, Products Liability-Drug Manufacturers-An Absolute Duty to Warn
Exists Notwithstanding Miniscule Statistical Probability of Harm, 18 DE PAuL L. REv. 829,
835 (1968-69).
" See Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 41 A.2d 850, 853 (Pa. 1945) (Words "Safety
Kleen" prominently displayed on all four sides of cleaning fluid container diluted effect of
small print warning). In addition, the force of a warning may be weakened by other
language on the product label. See La Plant v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d
231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (labeling on weed killer created the impression that it was not
harmful to humans).
712 See Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13
ST. MARY'S L.J. 521, 566 (1981-82).
11 See Britain, Product Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Comparison of Doctors' and
Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risks and the Importance of Consumer Expectations
in Determining Product Defect, 79 Nw. U.L. Rav. 342, 375-76 (1984); Comment, The
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?,
63 WAsH. L. Rav. 149 (1988).
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public. 4 Although this "learned intermediary" rule has been
criticized 75 and occasionally rejected 7 6 it generally is still applied
to prescription drugs. 77
II. COMMENT K's LIABILITY REGIME
There are several distinct risks associated with pharmaceutical
products. These include: (1) risks associated with the production
process; (2) risks arising from the inherent nature of the product;
(3) risks created by conscious design choices; and (4) scientifically
unknowable risks. Although each of these categories is different,
courts rarely make any distinctions among them as far as the
application of comment k to drug-related injuries is concerned.
14 See Note, supra note 70, at 728. As one court declared-
Ordinarily in the case of prescription drugs warning to the prescribing physi-
cian is sufficient. In such cases the choice involved is essentially a medical one
involving an assessment of medical risks in the light of the physician's knowl-
edge of his patient's needs and susceptibilities. Further it is difficult under
such circumstances for the manufacturer, by label or direct communication,
to reach the consumer with a warning. A warning to the medical profession
is in such cases the only effective means by which a warning could help the
patient.
Davis, 399 F.2d at 130; see also Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121,
123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977).
73 See Comment, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Consumer-Directed Informa-
tion-Enhancing the Safety of Prescription Drug Use, 34 CATm. U. L. Rv. 117, 138-50
(1984-85).
71 The learned intermediary rule is most often rejected in the case of vaccines that
are administered on a mass basis where no individual physician-patient relationship exists.
See Petty, 740 F.2d at 1440 (swine flu vaccine); Givens, 556 F.2d at 1345 (Sabin oral polio
vaccine); Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277 (oral polio vaccine); Graham, 666 F. Supp. at 1498 (DPT
vaccine).
Recently, however, a Massachusetts court in MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985), extended the exception to oral contraceptives. The
MacDonald court concluded that an oral contraceptive manufacturer was required to warn
individual consumers of product risks by means of package inserts. The court rejected the
learned intermediary rule because it felt that the patient, rather than the physician, played
the dominant role in making decisions about methods of birth control. Id. at 70.
" See Swayze, 807 F.2d at 470-71; Brooks, 750 F.2d at 1232 (cardiac pacemaker);
Stanback v. Parke-Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1981) (influenza vaccine);
Timm v. Upjohn Co., 624 F.2d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1980)
(Cleocin antibiotic); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (Aralen);
Dunkin, 443 F. Supp. at 123 (oral contraceptives); Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 192
(Ct. App. 1964) (Chloromycetin antibiotic); McKee, 648 P.2d at 25 (IUD); Cobb v. Syntex
Laboratories, Inc., 444 So. 2d 203, 205 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (oral contraceptives); Hill v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, 592 P.2d 1383, 1387-88 (Mont. 1979) (synthetic cortisone); Niemiera
v. Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112, 1117 (N.J. 1989) (DTP vaccine); Bacardi v. Holzman, 442
A.2d 617, 619 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981) (Diamox to treat glaucoma); Ferrigno, 420 A.2d at
1321 (DES); Terhune, 577 P.2d at 979 (IUD),
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A. Risks Associated with the Production Process
Ordinarily, product sellers are strictly liable for harm caused
by mishaps in the production process even though they could not
have discovered the condition or eliminated defective products by
the exercise of due care.78 Strict liability is imposed on product
sellers, particularly manufacturers, because they are in a good
position to control production flaws.7 9 Additionally, because claims
arising from manufacturing defects are relatively small in relation
to the number of units produced,80 product sellers can usually
obtain insurance at a reasonable cost.8'
Production flaws also occur in the pharmaceutical industry.
One class of production flaw involves drugs that deviate from their
accepted chemical formula. Since comment k requires that products
be "properly prepared," it usually does not immunize against
liability in such cases.8 2 Product contamination is another type of
production flaw. Although quality control standards are high in
the pharmaceutical industry, 3 impure or contaminated drugs some-
times enter the market.8 4 Although comment k shields sellers of
71 See Page, supra note 8, at 883.
19 See Note, Strict Liability in Hybrid Cases, 32 STAN. L. R v. 391, 394 (1980); Note,
The Medical Malpractice Citadel Still Stands, 11 CREIGHrON L. REv. 1357, 1359 (1978).
According to another theory of liability, since the manufacturer controls product quality,
the decision to distribute products knowing that some of them will be dangerous amounts
to a "taking" of the physical well-being of those who are injured by defective products.
Fairness considerations support a liability rule that requires the manufacturer to provide
compensation. See Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69
CAn'. L. Rav. 919, 936-37 (1981).
10 See McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through
the Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 1,
30 (1978); Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv.
681, 691-92 (1980); Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act-A Brief Overview, 33
VAND. L. Rav. 579, 585 (1980).
1, See Page, supra note 8, at 885. Liability insurance costs for manufacturers vary
according to the nature of the product. However, for the typical manufacturer, the cost of
insurance is about one percent of sales. See Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving
Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 796, 812 (1983).
u See Morris v. Parke-Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1336 (CJD. Cal. 1987); Toner
v. Lederle Laboratories, 732 P.2d 297, 305 (Idaho 1987).
,1 See Note, supra note 1, at 742. Not only do most drug companies have rigorous
quality control standards, but these internal safeguards are supplemented by the efforts of
the FDA, which closely monitors the manufacture of prescription drugs. See Federal Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2) (1984) (Requiring producers to use "current
good manufacturing practice."); 21 U.S.C. § 374(a)(1) (authorizing the FDA to inspect
factories to ensure that statutory standard is met); Comment, Warnings and the Pharma-
ceutical Companies: Legal Status of the Package Insert, 16 HousToN L. REv. 140, 143
(1978) (the entire industrial process of drug manufacture is closely regulated by the FDA).
14 See Note, supra note 43, at 240.
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"new and experimental drugs" from liability even when "purity
of ingredients" cannot be assured,85 it does not protect the purv-
eyors of ordinary pharmaceutical products against liability when
their products are contaminated.8 6
A more common risk arises from the failure to remove harmful
byproducts from the finished product. This problem sometimes
occurs in the manufacture of vaccines and other biologics.8 7 For
example, injuries can occur when substances used to culture vac-
cines are not completely removed from the finished product." This
condition is associated with the Pasteur vaccine, which is cultured
in the brains of small laboratory animals such as rats, mice, and
rabbits.8 9 Serious harm to the recipient can occur if small particles
of animal brain material are left in the vaccine. 90 In such cases,
however, the courts have found the Pasteur vaccine to be unavoid-
ably unsafe.9'
Virulent organisms in vaccines also can cause serious injuries.
Vaccines typically use killed or weakened disease-producing organ-
isms to create a natural immunity in the recipient's body. 92 A
vaccine, however, can cause the very disease it is supposed to
prevent if these harmful organisms are not neutralized. This prob-
lem has arisen in connection with the production of both Sabin
and Salk polio vaccines. 93
The Salk vaccine uses dead polio virus organisms to induce the
formation of antibodies in the recipient's body. Killed polio virus
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k, supra note 42.
16 See Abbott Laboratories v. Lapp, 78 F.2d 170, 174 (7th Cir. 1935) (manufacturer
held liable in negligence for allowing virulent bacteria to contaminate sterilized milk for-
mula); David v. McKesson & Robbins, 253 A.D. 728, 300 N.Y.S. 635, 636 (1937) (manu-
facturer held liable in negligence for sodium fluoride in bicarbonate of soda), aff'd, 278
N.Y.S. 622, 16 N.E.2d 127 (1938); see also Note, supra note 8, at 736 (plaintiff can recover
in strict liability if drug is adulterated).
11 Biologics are products that are cultured from living organisms. See Note, supra
note 43, at 235 n.2.
" This condition should be distinguished from serum sickness, which is not caused
by a production flaw, but instead is an antigen-antibody reaction to the injection of foreign
protein into the body. See Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1433 (8th Cir. 1984).
11 See Comment, supra note 45, at 1182.
9Id.
1, See Calabrese v. Trenton State College, 162 N.J. Super. 145, 392 A.2d 600, 604
(1978), aff'd, 82 N.J. 321, 413 A.2d 315 (1980).
92 See Note, Vaccine Related Injuries: Alternatives to the Tort Compensation System,
30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 919, 920-21 (1986); see also Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d
1390, 1392-93 (8th Cir. 1969).
91 See Franklin & Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from
the Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 C.Ani. L. REV. 754, 765-66 (1977).
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is incapable of causing disease, but can act as an antigen to
stimulate the production of antibodies that will attack any live
polio viruses entering the body.94 However, in Gottsdanker v.
Cutter Laboratories,9 Cutter Laboratories, a manufacturer of Salk
vaccine, failed to exclude live polio virus from some of its vaccine
even though it relied on government approved safety tests to pre-
vent this from happening.96 As a result, a number of vaccine
recipients contracted polio from the vaccine. 97 The defendant con-
tended that liability should not be imposed because the vaccine was
a "new" drug, and thus not subject to a strict liability rule. The
court, however, rejected this argument and held in favor of the
plaintiffs .98
The Sabin vaccine uses a weakened live virus that causes the
recipient's immune system to produce antibodies that are effective
against ordinary polio virus. 99 As the weakened strain reproduces
itself in the intestinal tract of the recipient, however, it occasionally
produces a form of virulent strain instead.'0 This can cause the
recipient, or those who come into close contact with the recipient,
to contract polio.' 0' Perhaps because the dangerous condition arises
after the vaccine leaves the manufacturer's control, the courts
generally have refused to impose strict liability in such cases. 02
See Note, supra note 43, at 237.
95 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1960).
See Note, Strict Liability for Drug Manufacturers: Public Policy Misconceived, 13
STAN. L. Rav. 645, 647 (1961). The Salk process had been developed and tested using small
batches of vaccine produced under laboratory conditions. The Salk inactivation process
proved to be less reliable under mass production conditions and several manufacturers had
difficulties with it. See Note, The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case Study of Manu-
facturers' Liability Without Fault in Tort and Warranty, 65 YALE L.J. 262, 262 n.2 (1955).
91 See Note, supra note 43, at 238.
9S Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320, 326 (Ct. App. 1960).
9 See Schwartz & Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An
Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 387, 388 (1987).
100 Id.
101 Plummer v. Lederle Laboratories, 819 F.2d 349, 351 (2d Cir. 1987).
102 See Plummer, 819 F.2d at 356; Givens v. Lederle Laboratories, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345
(5th Cir. 1977); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 418 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 128-29 (9th Cir.
1968); Williams v. Lederle Laboratories, 591 F. Supp. 381, 384 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Sheehan
v. Pima County, 660 P.2d 486, 487 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Johnson v. American Cyanamid
Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1323 (Kan. 1986); Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories, 328 N.W.2d 576, 579
(Mich. 1982); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Okla. 1975).
Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969), represents an exception to
this approach. The plaintiff contracted polio from the defendant's vaccine. The court held
that the vaccine was defective because it contained virulent polio virus instead of the harmless
variety, apparently assuming that the virulent strain was introduced into the vaccine during
the production process rather than afterwards. Id. at 374.
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Another type of production flaw involves failure to detect and
remove serum hepatitis from blood.103 Only one case, Cunningham
v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital,1°4 has refused to apply comment
k to serum hepatitis contamination. The Illinois Supreme Court
declared in Cunningham that blood contaminated with serum hep-
atitis could not be treated as an unavoidably unsafe product be-
cause it was impure. 0 5 However, the Cunningham court's
interpretation of comment k was widely criticized because comment
k expressly mentioned impure drugs as one class of potentially
unavoidably unsafe product1 6 For this reason, most courts apply
comment k to cases involving blood impurities. 0 7
B. Risks Arising from the Inherent Nature of a Product
The chemical or biological components of drugs and vaccines
can cause a variety of adverse effects on patients. Generally speak-
ing, these adverse reactions are classified as either Type A or Type
B reactions. 08 Type A reactions, such as side effects or extension
effects, are exaggerated but otherwise normal reactions to phar-
maceutical products. A side effect or secondary effect is one that
differs from the drug's intended or primary effect. Side effects
often occur when a drug has more than one pharmacological
action. For example, dextroamphetamine, which is used to control
appetite, also may elevate blood pressure or cause insomnia, rest-
lessness, or tachycardia because it also stimulates the central nerv-
ous system.' 9 When the pharmacodynamic effect produced by a
"0' Blood may be contaminated by serum hepatitis, a virus that cannot be detected in
the blood under present medical technology. See Comment, Blood Transfusions and the
Transmission of Serum Hepatitis: The Need for Statutory Reform, 24 AM. U. L. REv. 367,
368 (1976). This condition differs from the vaccine cases because the contaminant exists in
the donor's blood before the blood comes within the producer's control.
-- 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970).
201 Id. at 904; see also McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 352 F. Supp. 690
(W.D. Tenn. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972). The McDaniel court questioned
the application of comment k to contaminated blood. Apparently, the court felt that
comment k should cover only characteristics that are common or indigenous to the product.
Id. at 695.
'" See Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 527 P.2d 1075, 1077 (N.M. 1974); Comment,
supra note 103, at 403.
10' See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 125-26 (Colo.
1983); McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Ky. 1975); Moore v. Underwood
Memorial Hosp., 371 A.2d 105, 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977).
118 See Note, supra note 1, at 736.
,o See E. MARTIN, HAzARDs OF MEDICATION 323 (1971); L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 3, at § 50.01[6][d][ii], at 50-38. In addition, a particular pharmacologic mecha-
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drug is greater than intended, the result is known as an extension
effect." 0 For example, insulin, which is used to lower blood sugar
levels, may sometimes produce severe hypoglycemia instead."'
On the other hand, Type B reactions are totally aberrant effects
that are unrelated to a drug's normal pharmacology." 2 Many Type
B reactions are allergic in nature. Ordinarily, when a foreign sub-
stance is introduced into the bloodstream, the body creates anti-
bodies to combat it." 3 These antibodies combine with and neutralize
the antigen; however, if the body's defense mechanism fails to
operate effectively, "the body's equilibrium is upset, the antigen
prevails, and there is an allergic response.""14
In the few reported cases where this issue has arisen, courts
generally have refused to impose liability on drug manufacturers
for injuries caused by an adverse reaction to the drug's chemical
ingredients. For example, in Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical
Corp.,"5 a case involving the soporific drug Doriden, the court
declared that comment k would protect a manufacturer against
side effects that were inherent in the chemical composition of the
drug as long as a proper warning was given.1 6
nism may affect parts of the body outside the intended treatment area. For example, the
primary effect of an antibiotic is antimicrobial. However, when ingested, an antibiotic may
irritate the mucosa of the gastrointestinal tract and thereby cause diarrhea as a side effect.
See E. MARTIN, supra note 109, at 322-23 (1971).
See L. FRuMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at § 50.01[6][d][iii], at 50-38.
See E. MARTIN, supra note 109, at 323.
See Note, supra note 1, at 738 n.15 (citing M. RAWLINS & J. THOMPSON, Pathogen-
esis of Adverse Drug Reactions, in TEXTBOOK OF ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS (D. Davies ed.
1977)).
"' See Note, Legal Aspects of Allergy, 5 VAND. L. REv. 212, 213 (1952).
See Freedman, Allergy and Products Liability Today, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 479
(1963).
Almost all allergic reactions fall into one of four categories. In Type I reactions, the
allergen reacts with antibodies attached to tissue cells. Type I reactions occur almost
immediately when the body comes into contact with an allergen to which it has previously
been sensitized. Many food allergies produce Type I reactions.
Type II reactions occur when the antibody reacts with antigen that has come to adhere
to cells or tissues. This reaction produces toxins that damage cells. Adverse reactions from
the transfusion of incompatible blood are examples of Type II reactions.
Type III reactions result from deposits of soluble circulating antigen-antibody com-
plexes in tissue or vessels. Serum sickness is a form of Type III reaction.
Type IV reactions do not involve a direct antigen-antibody reaction. Instead, these
reactions occur when sensitized lymphocytes (T cells) come into contact with antigen. The
reaction may directly produce cell-destroying toxins or it may release lymphokines that
cause injury. Contact dermatitis is an example of a Type IV reaction. See K. TRESTMAN &
C. HOWES, Allergies in 3 ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, 65.11-.14, 65.9 (Gray 3d
ed. 1985).
1 502 F. Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1980).
116 Id. at 300.
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In another case, Davila v. Bodelson,n 7 a labor-inducing drug,
Pitocin, caused injury to the infant plaintiff during birth. The trial
court gave an instruction on comment k and the jury found in
favor of the defendant. On appeal, the Davila court affirmed the
lower court's finding that the drug was unavoidably unsafe." 8 The
appellate court expressly declared that the utility of Pitocin out-
weighed its known risks." 9
Vaccines also may possess inherent characteristics that can cause
the patient's immune system to react violently. 20 In Schindler v.
Lederle Laboratories,2' for example, the plaintiff contracted polio
after being administered the Sabin oral polio vaccine. The plaintiff
suffered from agammaglobulinemia, a congenital immune system
deficiency. This condition affected the plaintiff's ability to resist
viral or bacterial attack. Consequently, his immune system appar-
ently succumbed to the weakened polio virus in the vaccine instead
of producing antibodies against it. 122 The trial court directed a
verdict in the manufacturer's favor and this was affirmed on
appeal.'2 Although the appellate court did not expressly refer to
comment k, it no doubt regarded idiosyncratic responses, such as
occurred here, as essentially unavoidable.124
At least one court has found the diptheria-tetanus-pertussis
(DTP) vaccine to be unavoidably unsafe because of the inherent
risks associated with one of its components. The plaintiff in White
v. Wyeth Labs, Inc.'25 suffered from encephalopathy126 as a result
", 704 P.2d 1119 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
, The court declared that Pitocin could cause the mother to have hypertonic contrac-
tions during labor. "Hypertonic contractions squeeze extremely hard and are too long in
duration." Id. at 1128. Hypertonic contractions can injure an unborn child because they
cut off blood supply to the mother's uterus. This interruption of the blood supply can cause
a shortage of oxygen to the unborn child's brain, resulting in brain damage. Id.
"I "Other evidence indicated that, despite the risk attending the use of Pitocin, Pitocin
is a valuable and beneficial drug for the induction of labor. We conclude there was evidence
supporting the giving of the instruction [on comment k.]" Id.
110 See Comment, supra note 73, at 151; see also Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 779
F.2d 1429, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986) (transverse myelitis); Petty, 740 F.2d at 1433 (serum
sickness); Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517, 1519 (10th Cir. 1984) (transverse
myelitis); Samuels v. American Cyanamid Co., 495 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1009 (N.Y. 1985)
(Guillain-Barre Syndrome).
121 725 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1983).
,22 Id. at 1037.
" Id. at 1040.
124 The court also concluded that the manufacturer had not breached its duty to warn.
Id. at 1039-40.
'25 533 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1988).
"I The term "encephalopathy" is commonly used to describe various neurological
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of receiving a DTP vaccine. The vaccine's pertussis component was
made from whole Bordetella pertussis bacterium. 127 This bacterium
contains two substances, endotoxin and pertussis toxin, that are
suspected of having an adverse effect on the central nervous sys-
tem. 12 The plaintiff contended that the manufacturer should not
have used whole cell bacteria to produce its vaccine. The court,
however, concluded that whole cell bacteria must be used because
scientists had been unable to identify the specific antigens within
the bacterium that must be included to produce an effective vac-
cine. 129 Consequently, the court found the whole cell DTP vaccine
to be unavoidably unsafe and reversed a lower court judgment in
favor of the plaintiff.130
C. Risks Created by Conscious Design Choices
Although some drug-related risks are unavoidable in the sense
that they cannot be eliminated without changing the inherent nature
of the product, other risks are at least partly within the product
seller's control. These risks are analogous to product risks created
by manufacturer design choices. Nevertheless, courts often employ
comment k's risk-utility balancing approach in such cases rather
than the more rigorous risk-utility analysis that is customarily
utilized in product design cases.
Dosage levels are largely within a product seller's control.
Therefore, one would expect courts to treat dosage cases like
product 'design cases. However, some courts continue to apply
comment k in cases where a product seller markets a product with
more than one dosage level.
Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.13 1 represents the view
that comment k is inapplicable to such products. In Brochu, the
plaintiff claimed that high estrogen levels in the defendant's oral
contraceptives caused her to suffer a stroke. The pills contained
two milligrams of synthetic progestogen and 100 micrograms of
synthetic estrogen. The plaintiff claimed that, at the time of her
conditions such as encephalitis, Reyes syndrome, prolonged convulsions, acute infantile
hemiplegia, and infantile spasms. See David & Jalilian-Marian, DTP: Drug Manufacturers'
Liability in Vaccine Related Injuries, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 187, 197 (1986).
127 White v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 749 (Ohio 1988).
121 See Note, Tort Liability for DPT Vaccine Injury and the Preemption Doctrine, 22
IND. L. Rav. 655, 662 (1989).
11 White, 533 N.E.2d at 749.
M Id. at 754.
13, 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981).
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injury, the manufacturer was marketing oral contraceptives that
were just as effective as the higher dosage pills, but much less
risky. According to the plaintiff, the two milligram product was
"defectively designed" since a safer but equally effective pill was
available. 3 2 The trial court held in the plaintiff's favor.
On appeal, the court observed that "liability may attach if a
manufacturer did not take available and reasonable steps to lessen
or eliminate the danger of even a significantly useful and desirable
product."' 3 After reviewing the evidence, the federal appeals court
upheld the lower court's finding that the two milligram contracep-
tive pill was defective. 34
The plaintiff in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath35 also
challenged a manufacturer's decision to market an oral contracep-
tive pill with high estrogen levels. The plaintiff's doctor prescribed
Ortho-Novum 1/80 to prevent breakthrough bleeding, a condition
that is uncomfortable but not health threatening. 36 The plaintiff
claimed to have suffered massive kidney failure as a result of taking
the higher dosage pills.' 37 At trial, the plaintiff established that the
defendant also manufactured Ortho-Novum 1/50, another oral
contraceptive, which had a lower estrogen level than Ortho-Novum
1/80. Like the plaintiff in Brochu, Ms. Heath contended that
Ortho-Novum 1/80 was defective because a safer but equally ef-
fective product, Ortho-Novum 1/50, was available.
The trial court refused to give an instruction on comment k,
and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the
court held that comment k was applicable and reversed. 138 Never-
theless, the court acknowledged that a jury might reasonably con-
clude that Ortho-Novum 1/80 was not unavoidably unsafe. The
court declared that the extra 30 micrograms of synthetic estrogen
2 Id. at 654.
4Id. at 655, quoting Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H.
1978).
14 Id. at 655. The court also held that the manufacturer failed to provide an adequate
warning about the danger of a stroke. Id. at 659. However, the court made it clear that
liability could be based on defective design alone. According to the Brochu court, "when
an unreasonable danger could have been eliminated without excessive cost or loss of product
efficiency, liability may attach even though the danger was obvious or there was an adequate
warning." Id. at 655.
"W 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986).
'6 Id. at 411.
,17 The plaintiff's condition is known as hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS). Id. at
412.
"3 Id. at 415-16.
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subjected users to risks that outweighed the benefits of the higher
dosage product even though Ortho-Novum 1/80 was the only oral
contraceptive on the market that would prevent breakthrough
bleeding.1 39
Drug manufacturers also create risks when they combine several
chemically distinct drugs into a single product. Examples of such
drugs include Panalba, an antibiotic composed of tetracyline and
novobiocine, and Bendectin, an antinausea drug composed of di-
cyclomine, an antispasmodic, doxylamin, an antihistamine, and
pyridoxine.140 Nevertheless, courts sometimes have treated such
products as unavoidably unsafe even though the product seller
played a significant role in creating the risk.
In McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 41 the plaintiff suf-
fered a cardiac arrest and consequent brain damage after doctors
administered Innovar, an anesthetic, during an operation. Innovar
is a combination of fentanyl, a synthetic narcotic, and droperidol,
a major tranquilizer. The plaintiff did not deny that a physician
could properly administer either or both of these drugs to a patient
during an operation. He contended, however, that the ratio of
fentanyl to droperidol should be controlled by the anaesthesiologist
on the spot, not by the pharmaceutical manufacturer. 142
In the plaintiff's view, Innovar was defectively designed because
the ratio of these drugs was fixed by the manufacturer and, there-
fore, could not be varied by doctors in accordance with the pa-
tient's individualized circumstances. The plaintiff contended that
the manufacturer's decision to market Innovar in this fashion
created an avoidable and unreasonable risk of injury to patients.
The court, however, rejected this argument, relying instead on FDA
approval of Innovar to conclude that the drug was unavoidably
unsafe. 143
Vaccine manufacturers also use the combination approach.
Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stomsodt'44 is illustrative. The plaintiff in
that case suffered brain damage as a result of being vaccinated
with Quadrigen. Quadrigen is a combination of diptheria, tetanus,
pertussis, and polio vaccines. 45 The addition of polio vaccine to
,3' Id. at 414.
140 See Note, supra note 5, at 216-17.
14 241 N.W.2d 822 (1976).
,42 Id. at 827.
143 Id. at 828.
1- 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969).
141 Id. at 1391.
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the more conventional combination of diptheria, tetanus, and per-
tussis vaccines (DTP) required the manufacturer to use Phemerol
as a preservative instead of menthiolate, the preservative commonly
used in DTP vaccine. 46 Unfortunately, Phemerol apparently af-
fected the potency of the pertussis vaccine and this led to the
plaintiff's injury. 47 The plaintiff alleged that the product was
defective under a breach of warranty theory. 48 The jury apparently
agreed that the risks of Phemerol outweighed the benefits of ad-
ministering the vaccines together instead of separately. 149 A federal
appeals court affirmed a lower court judgment for the plaintiff.'50
Recently, a number of victims injured by the DTP vaccine have
claimed that DTP vaccines are defectively designed because man-
ufacturers have chosen to produce whole cell rather than split cell
vaccines.' 5' For example, the plaintiff in MacGillivray v. Lederle
Laboratories52 maintained that whole cell vaccine was riskier than
split cell and acellular vaccines. In his complaint, the plaintiff
alleged that use of the whole cell technique constituted a design
defect because a safer alternative was possible. 53 The defendant
moved to dismiss, arguing that FDA approval of the whole cell
vaccine preempted common law claims based on state products
liability law. 5 4 The court rejected the preemption claim, but failed
to decide the design defect issue. 15
The plaintiff in White v. Wyeth Labs, Inc.'16 also claimed that
whole cell DTP vaccine was defectively designed because safer
', Id. at 1393.
147 Id.
I" Id. at 1397.
149 Id. at 1399.
I" Id. at 1402. The court also concluded that the manufacturer's warning was inade-
quate. Id. at 1401.
M See Note, Vaccine-Related Injury Actions: Federal Preemption Reconsidered, 41
RurTaas L. REv. 373, 378-79 (1988).
" 667 F. Supp. 743 (D.N.M. 1987).
I d. at 744. The plaintiff in Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 779 F.2d at 1430-31,
made a similar argument.
'-, Manufacturers have raised the preemption defense in a number of DTP cases.
Generally, they have been unsuccessful. E.g., Abbott v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d
1108, 1113-14 (1988); Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1493-94 (D. Kan.
1987); Wack v. Lederle Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 123, 128 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Martinkovic
v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 215 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Morris v. Parke-Davis
& Co., 667 F. Supp. at 1340; White v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 533 N.E.2d at 751. Contra
Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, 651 F. Supp. 993, 1007 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (allowance of
failure to warn claim would destroy uniformity of FDA labeling regulations).
-s MacGillivray v. Lederle Laboratories Division, American Cyanimid Co., 667 F.
Supp. 743, 746 (1987).
"5 533 N.E.2d 748.
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alternatives, such as split cell and acellular vaccines, were techno-
logically feasible to produce. The court in White, however, found
no conclusive evidence to support the plaintiff's contention that
these alternatives were actually safer. Therefore, it concluded that
the whole cell vaccine was not defective.157
The courts have not limited comment k's protection to chemical
drugs and vaccines; on occasion they have extended it to medical
devices as well. For example, in Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co.,
Inc. ,15 the plaintiff claimed that the design of the Dalkon Shield
IUD increased the risk of uterine infection. According to the
plaintiff, the Dalkon Shield's fins had greater contact with the
surface of the uterus than the fins of other IUDs, thereby increasing
the chances of infection. The plaintiff also alleged that the defen-
dant's use of multifilament line in the product's tailstring caused
it to transmit bacteria from the vagina to the uterus more easily
than the tailstrings of other IUDs. 159 Although the increased risk
of infection was directly attributable to the IUD's design, the trial
court instructed the jury on comment k instead of allowing the
case to be tried on a design defect theory. Nevertheless, the jury
concluded that the product was defective, even under the more
relaxed risk-benefit standards of comment k.160
Even purely mechanical products have been characterized as
unavoidably unsafe. For example, in Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc.,'6 1
the plaintiff was required to undergo a second operation after his
cardiac pacemaker malfunctioned. The plaintiff claimed that the
tines or prongs on the pacemaker's endocardial leads were too
short to remain properly attached to the heart muscle. 62 The lower
court, however, rejected this argument. On appeal, the court de-
clared that comment k was applicable to the pacemaker even
though it was entirely mechanical in nature. 63 At the same time,
the court noted that the defendant had established at trial that the
' Id. at 754.
I's 764 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985).
I9 d. at 1338.
110 Id. at 1338-39. A number of courts have held that an IUD could qualify as an
unavoidably unsafe product. E.g., Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr.
396, 405-06 (1986); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 24 (Okla. 1982); Terhune v. A.H.
Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 977 (Wash. 1978).
- 750 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1984).
162 Id. at 1229. The cardiac pacemaker in question was made up of a pulse generator,
an endocardial wire lead, and metal electrodes. The lead was run intervenously into the
heart and attached to the heart tissue by the tines. Id. at 1229 n.I.
"I Id. at 1230.
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product's design conformed to the state of the art.164 Although the
court apparently felt that the pacemaker's risks were attributable
to the product's design, it seems to have concluded that the risk
of mechanical failure was unavoidable and was outweighed by the
product's benefits. 65
D. Scientifically Unknowable Risks
Drug manufacturers typically test their products on laboratory
animals and human volunteers before marketing them to the gen-
eral public. 66 However, some product risks cannot be discovered
until the product has been on the market for some time. 67 Risks
of this sort can be described as "scientifically unknowable" because
product manufacturers cannot discover them prior to marketing by
using existing scientific knowledge and technology. Most courts 68
Id. at 1229 n.3.
665 See also Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (flammable
surgical drape found to be unavoidably unsafe but manufacturer held liable for failure to
provide adequate warning); Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 662 P.2d 646, 651 (N.M. Ct. App.
1983) (mammary prothesis that leaked saline solution apparently found to be unavoidably
unsafe but manufacturer held liable for failure to provide adequate warning).
216 First, chemical compounds are selected for laboratory study on the basis of molec-
ular structure or relation to other compounds of known pharmacological characteristics.
These compounds are then tried on small laboratory animals to determine pharmacological
and pathological resilts. Also, a number of larger animals, usually dogs and monkeys, are
used to determine the margin of safety (the difference between no effect and a lethal dose)
for the drug. See Whitmore, Allergies and Other Reactions Due to Drugs and Cosmetics,
19 Sw. L.J. 76, 77 (1965).
Next, the formula is tested on human subjects. Normally, there are three phases of
human testing. First, preliminary trials are conducted on a small number of normal human
subjects to determine human toxicity, metabolism, absorption, elimination, and other phar-
macological reactions, as well as the preferred route of administration and safe dosage
range. Then initial trials are conducted on a small number of patients for specific disease
control or phrophylactic purposes. Finally, clinical trials are conducted on a large number
of patients by different physicians, all of whom follow the same investigational procedures.
This broad clinical trial permits the assessment of the drug's safety, effectiveness and
optimum dosage schedules in the diagnosis, treatment or prophylaxis of a group of subjects
with a given disease or condition. See Campbell, Civil Liability for Investigational Drugs:
Part I, 42 TEmPIE L.Q. 99, 106-07 (1969). See also 21 CFR § 312.21 (1989).
67 See Campbell, supra note 166, at 129.
6 See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) (manufacturer
of chloroquinine not liable for failure to warn that product might impair vision); Chambers
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir.
1977) (manufacturer of oral contraceptives not liable for failure to warn about danger of
stroke); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. Supp. 228, 232 (D.S.D. 1983), aff'd, 739
F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984) (manufacturer of DES not liable for failure to warn about
unforeseeable dangers); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988) (liability
for failure to warn about unknown risks would be contrary to comment k); Woodhill v.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
and commentators 169 agree that the duty to warn under comment
k is limited to "scientifically knowable" risks.
Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,70 decided by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in 1984, illustrates the reluctance of most courts to
hold drug manufacturers liable for scientifically unknowable risks. 71
In Feldman, the plaintiff's teeth became discolored after she was
treated with Declomycin, a tetracyline antibiotic drug. 72 The plain-
tiff sued the drug's manufacturer, claiming that it failed to provide
an adequate warning about the risk of tooth discoloration. The
defendant began to market Declomycin in 1959 and the plaintiff
was first treated with the product in 1960. According to the defen-
dant, the risk of tooth discoloration did not become known until
1962. The defendant claimed that it issued a warning as soon as it
discovered the risk. 7 3
The trial court held in favor of the defendant, and its decision
was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court. 74 On appeal, the
New Jersey Supreme Court declared that a hindsight test was
inappropriate in comment k cases, endorsing instead the use of a
"foresight" test. 7 5 Accordingly, the court ruled that the defendant
Parke-Davis, 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1980) (manufacturer of labor-inducing drug, Pitocin,
not liable for failure to warn mother about risk of brain damage to unborn child); Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. App. 1979) (manufacturer
of oral contraceptives not liable for failure to warn about risk of stroke); Cochran v.
Brooke, 409 P.2d 904, 907 (Or. 1969) (manufacturer of chloroquinine not liable for failure
to warn that product might impair vision); Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 340 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1978) (manufacturer of experimental drug, chymopapain, not liable for subsequently
discovered risk).
"9 See Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy
Behind Comment K, 42 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1139, 1144 (1985); Comment, Strict Liability
for Prescription Drugs: Which Shall Govern-Comment K or Strict Liability Applicable to
Ordinary Products?, 16 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Ray. 309, 324 (1986). But see Rheingold,
Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTERS L. Rav. 947,
1017 (1964); Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1, 107
(1973).
1 7 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
171 In 1982, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corporation, 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982), ruled that a manufacturer of asbestos insulation
could be held strictly liable for failure to warn about the health risks of its products even
if these risks were scientifically unknowable at the time the products were first marketed.
172 Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374, 376 (N.J. 1984).
7 Id. at 378-79.
17, Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 450 A.2d 579 (1982). After the intermediate
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, the plaintiff sought further review by the
New Jersey Supreme Court. The New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the case back to the
intermediate appellate court for reconsideration in light of Beshada. However, the inter-
mediate appellate court reaffirmed its original decision in favor of the defendant.
171 Feldman, 479 A.2d at 388.
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would not be held strictly liable if it acted as a reasonably prudent
manufacturer in discovering and warning about the risks associated
with its products.' 76
Under the foresight test adopted in Feldman and followed in
most other jurisdictions, product sellers are treated as experts in
their field, 77 and existing scientific knowledge is imputed to them. 178
They must test their products prior to marketing in order to dis-
cover potential risks.' 79 Furthermore, this duty is continuous; 180
sellers must keep abreast of scientific developments' 8' and must
search for previously undiscovered risks. 82 Warnings also must be
timely, 83 and sellers must immediately warn of newly discovered
risks or adverse reactions; 14 they cannot ignore reports of adverse
reactions. 85 Furthermore, the product seller may be required to
warn of a possible risk even before a causal connection has been
definitely established. 8 6 However, product sellers who satisfy these
176 Id. at 386.
' " See Dunn, 328 N.W.2d at 580; O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F:2d 286, 291 (8th
Cir. 1967); Toner, 732 P.2d at 307; Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1231
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 388 N.E.2d at 549; Krug v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 152 (Mo. 1967); McDaniel v. McNeil Labs, Inc., 241 N.W.2d
822, 830 (Neb. 1976); Feldman, 479 A.2d at 386; McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
528 P.2d 522, 528 (Or. 1974); Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835
(Utah 1984).
"I See Barson, 682 P.2d at 826; Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir.
1977).
,M' See Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305, 1320 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980);
Tinnerholm v. Parke-Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Barson, 682
P.2d at 836; Dayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
See Muilenberg v. Upjohn Co., 320 N.W.2d 358, 366 (Mich. App. 1982).
,s See Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980);
Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1970); O'Hare v. Merck &
Co., 381 F.2d 286, 291 (8th Cir. 1967); Graham, 666 F. Supp. at 1498-99; Krug, 416
S.W.2d at 152; Samuels, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 1011; Barson, 682 P.2d at 835.
M See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-90 (5th Cir.
1973); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligent Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE
L.J. 816, 853 (1962); Placitella & Darnell, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.:
Evolution or Revolution in Strict Products Liability?, 51 FoRanAm L. Rav. 801, 805 (1983).
- See Schenebeck, 423 F.2d at 922; Mobilia, Allergic Reactions to Prescription Drugs:
A Proposal for Compensation, 48 ALB. L. Ry. 343, 360-62 (1984); Comment, Unavoidably
Unsafe Drugs and the Duty to Warn, 29 ARK. L. R~v. 71, 75 (1975).
11w See Schenebeck, 423 F.2d at 922; Baker v. St. Agnes Hospital, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81,
85 (1979); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 222 (Pa. 1971); Barson, 682 P.2d at 835.
,s See Schenebeck, 423 F.2d at 922; Ferrigno, 420 A.2d at 1320.
'" See McCue v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 453 F.2d 1033 (1st Cir. 1972); Skill v.
Martinez, 91 F.R.D. 498, 514 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 677 F.2d 368 (3d Cir.
1982); Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Mahr v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Seley v. G.D. Searle, 423 N.E.2d 831,
837 (Ohio 1981).
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conditions will not be held liable for the consequences of unknown
risks.
E. Effect of Comment K on Producer Liability
Although comment k does not completely insulate sellers of
pharmaceutical products from liability, in many instances it allows
them to avoid responsibility for drug-related injuries. For example,
comment k protects sellers against liability for injuries caused by
dangerous byproducts that cannot be removed from a finished
product. This allows product sellers to escape liability for harm
caused by the presence of animal brain material in Pasteur rabies
vaccine, virulent polio virus in Sabin polio vaccine, or serum
hepatitis in transfused blood.
Comment k also protects sellers against liability for adverse
drug reactions caused by inherent characteristics of chemical drugs
or vaccines. If an adequate warning is provided, product sellers
are not liable for a drug's known side effects, nor are they respon-
sible for allergic reactions to pharmaceutical products.
Additionally, a number of courts refuse to impose liability on
product sellers who voluntarily choose to increase the risk associ-
ated with their product. For example, comment k apparently ap-
plies to manufacturers that combine several separate chemical drugs
or vaccines to create a single product even though this increases
the risk of injury from the product. Moreover, some courts have
applied comment k to injuries caused by medical devices, such as
IUDs and cardiac pacemakers, even though injuries resulted from
design choices by the product manufacturer.
Finally, comment k limits the duty to warn to risks that were
scientifically knowable when the product was sold. Consequently,
consumers often are unprotected against risks discovered after a
drug has been introduced into the market.
III. IMPACT OF STRICT LIABILITY ON PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT
SELLERS
Some commentators have suggested that comment k, by sub-
jecting sellers of pharmaceutical products to a lesser standard of
liability, gives them preferential treatment in comparison with other
product sellers.' 87 Implicit in this criticism is an assumption that
M, See Comment, An Escape from Strict Liability: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers'
Responsibility for Drug Related Injuries Under Comment K to Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 199, 215 (1984).
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pharmaceutical product sellers should be subjected to the same
liability standard as other product sellers. This portion of the
Article considers whether comment k has any useful role to play
in a strict liability regime. First, Part A discusses how strict liability
will increase the liability of product sellers.188 Next, Part B examines
the policy bases of strict products liability.189 Finally, Part C eval-
uates the concept of absolute liability and considers whether it is
a viable alternative to strict liability in some cases.' 90
A. Strict Liability for Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products
A shift from comment k to strict liability would increase the
liability exposure of pharmaceutical product sellers in every product
risk category except scientifically unknowable risks.
1. Risks Associated with the Production Process
As mentioned earlier, comment k often insulates product sellers
from liability for injuries caused by failure to remove harmful
byproducts from the finished product. Conversely, sellers of phar-
maceutical products would enjoy no such immunity under strict
liability in states that apply the deviation-from-the-norm test to
production flaws. Under this approach, individual units that devi-
ate from the rest of the product line are considered defective.' 9' If
this test were applied to pharmaceuticals, then products such as
vaccines or blood that contained harmful byproducts, or polio
vaccine that contained virulent strains of polio virus, would be
regarded as defective since they differ from uncontaminated prod-
ucts of the same description.' 92
,u See infra notes 191-217 and accompanying text.
,, See infra notes 218-92 and accompanying text.
,90 See infra notes 293-328 and accompanying text.
M See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 881 (Alaska 1979); Jiminez v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 482 P.2d 681, 684 (Cal. 1971); see also Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rav. 363, 367 (1965).
92 The consumer expectation test, discussed below, might also be applicable to harmful
byproduct cases. This test is often used in cases where food is contaminated with byproducts
of the production process. See Hochberg v. O'Donnell's Restaurant, Inc., 272 A.2d 846,
848-49 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (olive pit in martini olive); Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc.,
201 So. 2d 824, 826 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967) (walnut shell in maple nut ice cream); Bryer v.
Rath Packing Co., 156 A.2d 442, 446 (Md. 1959) (chicken bone in chicken chow mein);
Allen v. Grafton, 164 N.E.2d 167, 174 (Ohio 1960) (oyster shell in fried oysters); Williams
v. Braum Ice Cream Stores, Inc., 534 P.2d 700, 702 (OkI. Ct. App. 1974) (cherry pit in
cherry ice cream); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 103 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Wis. 1960) (chicken
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2. Risks Arising from the Inherent Nature of a Product
In the absence of comment k, liability might also be imposed
on product sellers for injuries caused by risks that are attributable
to a product's inherent chemical or biological character. Tradition-
ally, courts have applied either the consumer expectation test or a
risk-utility test in inherent risk cases. Under the consumer expec-
tation test, a product is regarded as defective if it is more dangerous
than the ordinary consumer would expect it to be. 93 The consumer
expectation test does not require the manufacturer to produce a
perfectly safe product, but it does protect against unexpected risks. 194
Therefore, products are not defective under the consumer expec-
tation test simply because some inherent characteristic makes them
dangerous to consumers; however, products must conform to ac-
cepted community norms of safety in order for product sellers to
avoid liability.
Comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts illustrates the distinction between known and unknown risks. 95
bone in chicken sandwich).
However, unlike common processed food products, consumers are often unfamiliar
with pharmaceutical products and have little knowledge about the risks associated with the
production process. Thus, while consumers may expect to find a cherry pit in cherry pie,
they almost certainly would not expect to find a virulent strain of polio virus in a polio
vaccine. See Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42
IND. L.J. 301, 305 (1967), which suggests that drug manufacturers might be held strictly
liable under the consumer expectation test for injuries resulting from the existence of harmful
byproducts in biologics.
,93 See Boy v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 P.2d 612, 620 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Dunham
v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ill. 1969); Hancock v. Paccar,
Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25, 37 (Neb. 1979); Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1362-
63 (Okla. 1974); Tinderman v. Fleetwood Homes, 684 P.2d 1302, 1305 (Wash. 1984); Estate
of Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 587 P.2d 160, 163-64 (Wash. 1978).
'94 See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 16 (1965).
"I' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1979). Comment i declares:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective condition of
the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Many
products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any
food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-
consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil
found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture. That is not what is
meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The article sold must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially
dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of
fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably dan-
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Comment i mentions "good" butter, whiskey, and tobacco as
examples of products that are potentially harmful, but not defec-
tive, under the consumer expectation test. These products are con-
sidered defective only if they create a different risk from the risk
consumers would expect to encounter when they use the product. 196
Arguably, uncontaminated and properly formulated pharmaceuti-
cal products are analogous to "good" butter, whiskey, and tobacco
and, therefore, should not be regarded as defective when inherent
characteristics cause injury to consumers.
On the other hand, one may contend that comment i reflects
the notion that product sellers are not liable for risks that are
widely known and understood by the general population because
consumers voluntarily "assume" these risks when using the prod-
uct. 197 However, consumers are unlikely to be as familiar with the
inherent risks associated with pharmaceutical products as they are
with the risks associated with ordinary consumer goods. 198 Absent
such knowledge, consumers are likely to assume that pharmaceu-
tical products are generally safe.119 If this assumption is correct,
sellers of pharmaceutical products may not avoid responsibility for
risks that are not matters of common knowledge in jurisdictions
that follow the consumer expectation test of comment i in inherent
risk situations.
Some courts have proposed that, in inherent risk cases, the
risk-utility test, normally associated with product design cases, be
gerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco
containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. Good
butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such is the case, it
deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter,
contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
Id.
1' Thus, whiskey contaminated with a dangerous amount of fusel oil, tobacco contam-
inated with marijuana, or butter contaminated with poisonous fish oil all would be consid-
ered defective under this principle. See id.
197 See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
843 (1973).
, See Dickerson, supra note 192, at 307.
"See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 350
(1974); Rheingold, What Are the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations"?, 22 Bus. LAW.
589, 595 (1967). Perhaps the consumer expectation test could be qualified by imputing to
consumers knowledge of all risks disclosed in product warnings. To be sure, warnings are
normally communicated to physicians rather than to consumers, but physicians are expected
to inform their patients of any risks known to them. See Tietz, Informed Consent in the
Prescription Drug Context: The Special Case, 61 WAsH. L. REv. 367, 370-71 (1986);
Comment, Drug Product Liability: Duty to Warn, 49 U. P=-T. L. REv. 283, 291-94 (1987).
Another way to limit the liability of product sellers would be to focus on the expectations
of physicians and other health care experts rather than those of consumers.
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used instead of comment k.200 In design defect cases, the court
determines by considering various factors whether an alternative
design should have been employed. These factors include: (1) the
likelihood that the product would cause harm; (2) the seriousness
of that harm; (3) the technological feasibility of using an alternative
design; (4) the relative costs of producing and marketing an alter-
natively designed product; and (5) any new or increased risks that
may result from the alternative design. 201
The risk-utility test used in product design cases, however, does
not seem to be well-suited to inherent risk cases. In a design defect
case, the court or the jury can compare the product as designed
with an alternative design for the same product and thereby reach
(in theory) a principled decision. However, in an inherent risk case,
there is seldom any obvious alternative with which to compare the
product. Either the jury must evaluate the product's social risks
and benefits in a vacuum or it must compare the product's risks
and benefits with those of an entirely different product. The latter
approach almost certainly would lead to inconsistent results. For
example, if an oral contraceptive user suffers a stroke, a jury might
decide that IUDs or diaphragms are superior to oral contraceptives
as a means of birth control; but if the victim is injured by an IUD,
the jury might just as easily conclude that oral contraceptives are
better. 2
3. Risks Created by Manufacturer Design Choices
Risks in pharmaceutical products that result from manufacturer
choice strongly resemble design risks in ordinary products. Con-
sequently, in the absence of comment k, courts probably would
subject pharmaceutical products to the same risk-utility balancing
m See Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 779 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1986); Brochu v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 655 (Ist Cir. 1981); Brown v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470, 477-78 (Cal. 1988); Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 710 P.2d
247, 262 (Cal. 1985); Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1167 (Cal. 1984).
"I See Uniform Product Liability Act § 104(B), 44 C.F.R. 60,714-21 (1979).
"2 Compare Note, The Intrauterine Device: A Criterion of Governmental Complaisance
and an Analysis of Manufacturer and Physician Liability, 24 CLav. ST. L. REv. 247, 292
(1975) (risks of IUD may outweigh utility since other methods of birth control are available)
with Note, Liability of Birth Control Pill Manufacturers, 23 HAsmncs L.J. 1526, 1545
(1972) (birth control pills should not be considered unavoidably unsafe since other methods
of birth control are available).
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test that is used in ordinary product design cases. 2°3 Under this
approach, the court or jury determines whether the risks and
benefits of the product as designed outweigh the risks and benefits
of an alternative design proposed by the plaintiff, 204
Comment k also uses a risk-utility approach. In theory, there-
fore, it should not matter which test is used in drug design cases
since either test should lead to the same result. However, there are
some significant differences in the way these two risk-utility tests
operate in practice. 20 5 Sellers of pharmaceutical products are more
likely to be held liable under a product design risk-utility standard
than under the approach typically applied by the courts under
comment k.
First, the risk-utility analysis tends to be somewhat perfunctory
in comment k cases. 2 For example, the courts often find a product
to be socially useful as a matter of law rather than leaving the
matter up to the jury. In contrast, in product design cases, risks
and benefits are examined more thoroughly by the court, and the
design defect issue usually is decided by the jury.207 Moreover,
courts in comment k cases rarely make any explicit comparisons
between the product in question and possible alternatives. In con-
ventional product design cases, however, the product as designed
is explicitly compared with an alternative (safer) design suggested
by the plaintiff.
21, A few courts continue to use the consumer expectation test in design defect cases.
E.g., Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) (alternative test);
Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 242 S.E.2d 671, 680 (S.C. 1978); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-
Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 798-99 (Wis. 1975).
Another approach is the prudent manufacturer test. Under this alternative, the jury is
asked to determine whether a prudent manufacturer, with knowledge of the product's
dangerous characteristics, would place it into the stream of commerce. See Nicholas v.
Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Ky. 1980); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,
525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (Or. 1974); Birmbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 V.AD. L. Rav. 593, 618-31
(1980).
I" See Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design:
Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MmN. L. REv. 773, 773-78 (1979).
1*S See Edell, Risk Utility Analysis of Unavoidably Unsafe Products, 17 SETON HALL
L. Rnv. 623, 638-46 (1987).
20 See Burke, DPT Vaccine Controversy: An Assessment of the Liabilities of Manu-
facturers and Administering Physicians Under Several Legal Theories, 17 SaTON HALL L.
Rnv. 541, 558 (1987).
I' See Note, Can a Prescription Drug Be Defectively Designed?-Brochu v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 31 DE PAuL L. Rav. 247, 267-68 (1981) (design defect risk-utility
approach usually would cause case to go to jury, thereby placing manufacturer at a
disadvantage in comparison with comment k approach).
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Plaintiffs' chances of recovery are enhanced even more in states
that follow the rule of Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. 20 According
to the prevailing view, plaintiffs in product design cases must prove
that their proposed alternative design is superior in cost-benefit
terms to the design actually employed by the product seller. A
plaintiff who fails to sustain this burden of proof will not recover
against the product seller.20 9 Barker, however, places this burden
on the defendant instead of the plaintiff in product design cases.
In Barker, the California Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
could use either the consumer expectation test or the risk-utility
test to establish that a product was defectively designed. 210 Under
the risk-utility aspect of Barker, the court would consider the usual
risk-utility factors, 21' but the burden of persuasion would fall on
the defendant rather than on the plaintiff. Thus, once the plaintiff
showed that the product in question caused his or her injury, the
defendant would have to prove that the utility of the product as
designed outweighed the utility of an alternatively designed prod-
uct.212 In effect, the Barker approach penalizes the defendant,
rather than the plaintiff, when information is unavailable about
the feasibility, cost, and benefits of alternative designs. In drug
liability cases, since information on alternative designs is frequently
difficult for either party to obtain, product sellers would lose cases
under the Barker rule that they probably would win under comment
k.
4. Scientifically Unknowable Risks
As mentioned earlier, the product seller's duty to warn under
comment k is limited to risks that fall within the scope of existing
scientific knowledge or that can be discovered by the application
of existing technology.213 However, this principle is not limited to
comment k cases, but applies to product warnings generally. Con-
sequently, the seller of an unavoidably unsafe product would not
- 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
20 See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Or. 1978).
2t0 Barker, 573 P.2d at 455-56.
211 The Barker court declared that "a jury may consider, among other relevant factors,
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger
would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of
an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that
would result from an alternative design." Id. at 455.
212 Id.
211 See Brown, 751 P.2d at 480; Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J.
1984).
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be held liable for failing to provide a warning about a scientifically
unknowable risk even if comment k were abolished.
The general duty to warn under section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts is set forth in comment j. Comment j
essentially applies negligence principles to the duty to warn.214 These
principles not only determine a warning's adequacy with respect to
factual content, expression, and method of communication, 215 but
they also limit the product seller's liability to risks that were either
known or reasonably foreseeable. 216
In the past, the courts have invoked comment j to determine
the duty of a pharmaceutical product seller to warn, either inde-
pendently or in conjunction with comment k.217 Therefore, they
are likely to rely on comment j in duty to warn cases even if
comment k is replaced by a rule of strict liability. If this assumption
is correct, sellers of pharmaceutical products would remain free
from liability for scientifically unknowable risks.
B. Policy Considerations
Over the years, courts and commentators have relied on several
rationales to justify the imposition of strict liability on product
214 See DuLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 229 (8th Cir. 1983); Brochu,
642 F.2d at 656-58; Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1980);
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-90 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969);
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969); Graham v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1499 (D. Kan. 1987); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
441 F. Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977); Smith v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 273 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Mich. 1979); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 423
N.Y.S. 95, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). But see Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1441
(8th Cir. 1984); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1233 n.13 (4th Cir. 1984); Finn,
677 P.2d at 1160 (Bird, J., dissenting); Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1108 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1976); see also Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model of Decision,
53 TEx. L. REv. 1375, 1384-85 (1974-75); Robb, A Practical Approach to the Use of State
of the Art Evidence in Strict Product Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 13 (1982);
Comment, Drug Products Liability: Duty to Warn, 49 U. PITr. L. REv. 283, 288 (1987);
Comment, New Jersey Supreme Court Rejects State of the Art Defense in Strict Liability
Actions Alleging Failure to Warn, 17 SussoLK U. L. Rav. 1071, 1075-76 (1983).
21S See supra notes 42-186 and accompanying text.
216 See Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undis-
coverable Product Defects, 71 GEo. L.J. 1635, 1638-39 (1983); Britain, Product Honesty is
the Best Policy: A Comparison of Doctors' and Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug
Risks and the Importance of Consumer Expectations in Determining Product Defect, 79
Nw. U. L. RE,. 342, 378-80, 396-98 (1984).
217 See, e.g., Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1981);
McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. Supp. 228, 231-32 (D.S.D. 1983), aff'd, 739 F.2d 340
(8th Cir. 1984); Brown, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 776; Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman,
388 N.E.2d 541, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
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sellers. For example, strict liability eliminates the plaintiff's need
to prove negligence in order to recover and also encourages product
honesty. Additionally, strict liability promotes allocative efficiency
and provides a mechanism for spreading losses.218 This section
considers whether these policies would also support a shift from
comment k to strict liability for sellers of pharmaceutical products.
To some degree, each of these rationales supports strict liability as
opposed to comment k's less burdensome liability standard. At the
same time, other considerations militate against excessive liability
for sellers of pharmaceutical products.
1. The "Burden of Proof" Rationale
One justification for strict liability is that it permits injured
parties to recover against product sellers without having to prove
negligence.2 9 By relieving plaintiffs of this burden, strict liability
enhances the chances of recovery for those with meritorious claims
and reduces the costs of litigation. 0
This "burden of proof" rationale also appears to support the
imposition of strict liability on sellers of pharmaceutical products.
Plaintiffs who are injured by defective pharmaceutical products
might have great difficulty establishing wrongdoing on the part of
product sellers as required under the law of negligence. With its
focus on the product, rather than on the conduct of the product
seller,"1 the theory of strict liability provides a better chance of
recovery for injured parties than negligence.
For example, in production flaw cases, under comment k, the
plaintiff must prove that more effective production or detection
techniques are technologically and economically feasible. In con-
trast, under the deviation-from-the-norm test used to evaluate pro-
213 See generally Powers, Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict Lia-
bility, 62 N.C.L. Rv. 415, 423-28 (1984).
1,9 See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Cal. 1972); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962); Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982).
See Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALw.
L. REv. 919, 933 (1981). Strict liability avoids "circuity of actions" by allowing the injured
party to sue the manufacturer directly instead of having to show negligence on the part of
some other party in the distributive chain. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MnN. L. REv. 791, 816 (1966).
21 See Caterpillar, 593 P.2d at 883; Kerns v. Engelke, 390 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ili. 1979);
Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 958 (Md. 1976); Little v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911, 913 (1979).
[VOL. 78
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY
duction flaws under strict liability, the plaintiff would merely have
to show that the product causing the harm was different from
other units sold by the defendant.
Likewise, under comment k, the plaintiff who is injured be-
cause of some inherent characteristic of the product must establish
that the risk of such injuries outweighs the product's therapeutic
benefits. Expert testimony on this issue is likely to be difficult and
expensive to obtain. On the other hand, if the rules of conventional
strict liability are applied, the plaintiff merely has to show that the
product failed to meet ordinary consumer expectations. Since juries
can determine ordinary consumer expectations without the aid of
expert testimony, litigation costs for the plaintiff are likely to be
lower if this approach is used.
Where the pharmaceutical product's design is at issue, the
approach used under strict liability is also more favorable to the
plaintiff than that employed under comment k. This is because, as
mentioned earlier, courts applying comment k tend to view a
product's risks and benefits in isolation, while courts applying
ordinary design defect principles place more emphasis on the risks
and benefits of an alternative design. This improves a plaintiff's
chances of recovery because it is easier for a jury to conclude that
a product is defective when evidence about safer alternatives is
given a prominent role in the case.
Of course, the plaintiff in a design defect case still has a
difficult burden to overcome if the conventional risk-utility test is
used. On the other hand, the plaintiff's chances of prevailing in
design defect cases are greatly increased in states that apply the
Barker approach since it shifts the burden of proof with respect to
risk-utility to the defendant.m
If the burden of proof rationale is based on the notion that
injured parties generally should prevail against those who caused
their injuries, then this rationale supports strict liability, as opposed
to negligence or comment k's liability standard. That is, plaintiffs
will win more often if strict liability is applied than if a lesser
standard of liability is applied to sellers of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. On the other hand, one can argue that the burden of proof
rationale is based on the assumption that most product-related
injuries are caused by unprovable acts of negligence by product
I See Barker, 573 P.2d at 455.
1989-90]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL [VoL. 78
sellers. 223 This version of the burden of proof rationale is much
less persuasive as a justification for strict liability where product
sellers often lack control over product risks. Sellers of pharmaceu-
tical products lack control over risks arising from the inherent
nature of a product and risks that are scientifically unknowable.
Consequently, one cannot impute negligent or blameworthy con-
duct to them simply because their products cause injury. For this
reason, the burden of proof rationale does not support strict lia-
bility in cases that involve truly unavoidable risks.
2. The "Product Honesty" Rationale
Courts also have held product sellers strictly liable to injured
consumers under a "representational" theory of liability. 4 Ac-
cording to this rationale, sellers may impliedly represent products
to be safe for their intended functions simply by placing them in
the stream of commerce. 225 Advertising reinforces this implied rep-
resentation of safety and often engenders a misplaced sense of
security in the minds of consumers.22 6 Since product sellers create
false expectations of safety in order to increase sales, they should
be required to compensate injured consumers when their products
are found to be less safe than represented.2 7
213 See Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960) (there is not more than one case in a hundred in which strict liability
would result in recovery where negligence would not); see also Schwartz, New Products,
Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 796, 802-10 (1983)
(manufacturing defects are often the result of negligence and the high correlation between
product defects and manufacturer negligence makes it wasteful to litigate the negligence
issue in product liability cases).
11 See Johnson v. Marshall & Huschart Mach. Co., 384 N.E.2d 141, 143 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1978); Phipps, 363 A.2d at 958; Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d
140, 149 (N.J. 1979); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 532-33 (Or. 1973); Hall
v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 791 (Wash. 1984).
2u See Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function
and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1107, 1242-45 (1974);
Schwartz, Products Liability and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk
Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 730 n.59 (1985).
See Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv.
681, 684 (1980); Henderson, supra note 220, at 939. Arguably, representations of safety
made in advertisements not only cause consumers to underestimate product risks, but in
some cases they may even nullify a consumer's consent to assume such risks. See Page,
Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Liability, 58 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 853, 889 (1983).
2" See Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing
Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REV. 465 (1978).
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Arguably, the product honesty rationale is not applicable to
sellers of ethical s drugs because they normally direct their pro-
motional activities at health care professionals rather than the
general public. Unlike the sellers of ordinary consumer goods, drug
companies do not generate public demand for their products by
advertising or other promotional efforts.2 9 Furthermore, consum-
ers presumably are aware that some prescription drugs are danger-
ous since drug manufacturers continually warn about product
risks. 230
Still, pharmaceutical companies vigorously promote their prod-
ucts to physicians through personal contacts by sales representatives
and advertisements in professional journals. In this manner, they
project a favorable image of their products to the public indirectly
through the medical profession. 21  Consequently, the representa-
tional theory of liability does provide some support for a strict
liability rule in the case of pharmaceutical products.
3. The Allocative Efficiency Rationale
The goal of allocative efficiency is to distribute society's eco-
nomic resources in a way that maximizes social welfare.2 2 Strict
liability promotes allocative efficiency by encouraging product sell-
ers to invest in product safety and thereby reduce the number of
product-related injuries.2 3 Additionally, strict liability causes prod-
uct prices to reflect the true costs of production, including the cost
of unavoidable product injuries, and thus ensures that members of
the public will not "overconsume" dangerous products.2 4
Many courts agree with the "safety incentive" theory of strict
liability.25 According to this view, product sellers have little incen-
n Ethical, "[w]hen said of a drug[, means] restricted to sale only on a doctor's
prescription." WEBSTER'S 9T NEW CoLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 429 (9th ed. 1983).
21 Although drug companies do not advertise to the general public, they aggressively
promote their products within the medical profession. These promotional efforts obviously
affect product sales. Moreover, drug companies are beginning to advertise certain prescrip-
tion drugs, such as hair treatment products, in media directed at the general public.
2" See Rheingold, supra note 199, at 597.
"I See Shapo, supra note 225, at 1225.
21 See R. POSNER, ECONO nc ANALYsis OF LAW 4 (1972).
"' See Owen, supra note 226, at 711-13; Note, Prescription Drugs and Strict Liability:
The Flaw in the Ointment, 19 PAc. L.J. 193, 198 (1987).
See Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy and Alter-
native Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACuSE L. Rnv. 897, 946-47 (1988); Henderson, supra
note 220, at 933.
2' See, e.g., Salt River Project Agric. Improv. & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 694 P.2d 198, 205-06 (Ariz. 1984); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187,
218 (Colo. 1984); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tenn. 1973).
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tive to spend money on product safety where they bear no respon-
sibility for product-related injuries. 2 6 By requiring product sellers
to compensate injured consumers, strict liability forces them to
choose between paying for the cost of product injuries or -spending
money on injury-prevention measures. 237
Of course, strict liability does not compel sellers to make their
products safe at any cost; product sellers will spend money to
prevent harm when it is cost-effective to do so, but they will simply
pay damage claims when the cost of compensation is less than the
cost of preventing injuries. 238 In this manner an optimal level of
product safety, based on what the public is actually willing to pay
for, ultimately will be achieved.
Strict liability also is justified in terms of "market deterrence."
The theory of market deterrence presupposes that the prices of
goods must reflect their true social costs, including the costs of
product-related injuries, if the market is to allocate goods effi-
ciently within a society.2 9 If these costs are not placed on the
product seller, the price of the product will be artificially low and
demand for the product will be higher than market forces ordinarily
would support3m However, if the product seller is forced to raise
- See Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Product Liability, 17 STAN. L. Rav. 1077, 1090-
92 (1965) (from a producer's standpoint, the object of quality control is to maximize profits,
not to optimize quality). In such a case, the costs of injuries are said to be externalized.
Externalities arise when the private costs of an activity are not equivalent to its social costs
(including the costs of injuries); see also Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction:
Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 221, 231-32
(1980).
217 Because assembly line production is well adapted to the use of safety tests and
other quality control measures, manufacturers are able to calculate accident costs and
improve product safety when it is cost effective to do so. See Note, Strict Liability in
Hybrid Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 391, 394 (1980); Comment, Strict Liability-The Medical
Malpractice Citadel Still Stands, 11 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1357, 1359 (1978). However,
wholesalers, retailers, and others in the distribution chain also can protect consumers from
unsafe products, either by inspecting them before sale, by dealing only with reputable
manufacturers, or by exerting pressure on manufacturers to make their products safer. See
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171-72 (Cal. 1964); Prosser, supra note
220, at 816.
"I See Green & Moore, Winter's Discontent: Market Failure and Consumer Welfare,
82 YALE L.J. 903, 912 (1973); Note, Sales of Defective Used Products: Should Strict Liability
Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 805, 815 (1978-79).
"I See McKean, Product Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. Cm. L. Rv. 3,
41-42 (1970-71); Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. CoLo. L. REv.
153, 159 (1976). It is assumed that consumers tend to underestimate product risks. Therefore,
unless they are reminded of these risks by means of pricing signals, consumers will over-
consume relatively risky products. See Henderson, supra note 220, at 933.
See G. CALARESi, Tim CosTs OF ACCIDENTS 70 (1970).
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prices to reflect the costs generated by product-related injuries,
demand for the product will fall accordingly in response to these
higher prices.
Note that the market theory rationale supports the imposition
of strict liability on product sellers even when they cannot eliminate
a product-related risk. If product-related injuries cannot be pre-
vented, sellers will be forced to raise their prices to pay the costs
of compensating injured consumers. However, since higher prices
usually decrease consumer demand for the product, fewer products
will be produced. As the production of dangerous products falls,
the number of product-related injuries also should decline.u4
In general, the safety incentive rationale seems to support the
imposition of strict liability on suppliers of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. Product sellers are responsible for the development and testing
of new products and, as such, are in a good position to discover
and reduce the risks associated with their products. Strict liability
creates an incentive to invest in research and product testing; it
also encourages product sellers to take other precautionary meas-
ures to minimize harm to consumers. 242
The argument for market deterrence is less obvious where
pharmaceuticals are concerned than it is in the case of dangerous
products with relatively little social utility. Indeed, most people
would find it hard to believe that society is in danger of "over-
consuming" pharmaceutical products because they are too cheap.
Nevertheless, higher prices for drugs would serve a legitimate al-
locative function by creating an economic incentive to develop safer
alternatives. In theory, this ultimately would reduce "unavoidable"
injuries to an optimal level.
The allocative efficiency rationale seems particularly applicable
to production flaws in pharmaceutical products. Presently, sup-
pliers of blood and vaccines often escape liability for production-
related injuries because such injuries are considered unavoidable.
However, if strict liability were imposed on product sellers, they
would attempt to improve current production and detection tech-
nology in order to reduce or eliminate the risk of injury from
harmful byproducts.
2' See Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications
of the Theory of Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036, 1040 (1980).
W' Note, The Duty to Warn Under Strict Products Liability as Limited by the Knowl-
edge Requirement: A Regretful Retention of Negligence Concepts, 26 ST, Louis U.L.J. 125,
149 (1981-82).
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The contamination of transfused blood by serum hepatitis virus
is an example of a risk that comment k treats as unavoidable. At
the present time, serum hepatitis virus cannot be physically re-
moved from the blood. Although tests can detect the presence of
serum hepatitis in the blood, these tests are not completely accu-
rateY23 Arguably, strict liability would encourage blood banks and
hospitals to support the development of better detection methods. 2 4
Strict liability also would provide an incentive for blood suppliers
to implement better donor screening proceduresY 5 It is universally
acknowledged that volunteer donors are much less likely to transmit
hepatitis virus than paid donorsY 6 Strict liability would encourage
blood suppliers to search for new sources of volunteer donors and
thereby reduce the risk of injury from impure blood 47
The allocative efficiency rationale is less compelling where
products with inherent risks are concerned. Since these risks cannot
be eliminated without changing the product's essential nature, hold-
ing product sellers liable provides no direct incentive for sellers to
make their products safer. Furthermore, because of their familiarity
with individual patient characteristics, physicians and other health
care providers might be better able to reduce the risk of injury
from side effects or allergic reactions than product sellers.
Nevertheless, even if the product itself cannot be made safer,
product sellers could develop other risk reduction strategies to
lessen the number of injuries. For example, since product sellers
routinely monitor the performance of their products after the prod-
ucts are approved for sale by the FDA,248 strict liability might
promote better reporting and analysis of adverse drug reactions
141 See Comment, Blood Transfusions and the Transmission of Serum Hepatitis: The
Need for Statutory Reform, 24 AM. U.L. Rv. 367, 376-81 (1974-75).
2" See Note, Liability for Serum Hepatitis in Blood Transfusions, 32 OHo ST. L.J.
585, 598-99 (1971).
24 See Discussion, Strict Liability-A Hospital is Strictly Liable for Transfusions of
Hepatitis Infected Blood, 48 Cm.[-]KENT L. REv. 292, 297 (1971); Comment, Hepatitis and
Strict Liability, 25 U. MLAQ L. REv. 349, 353 (1971).
2" Paid donors are about ten times more likely to transmit hepatitis than volunteer
donors. See Franklin, Hepatitis, Blood Transfusions, and Public Action, 21 CATH. U.L.
REv. 683, 684 (1972).
247 Presently, paid donors account for about one-third of the blood supply. The risk
of serum hepatitis contamination could be considerably reduced if blood suppliers made an
effort to increase the share of blood obtained from volunteer sources. Id. at 683-84.
See Mobilia, Allergic Reactions to Prescription Drugs: A Proposal for Compensa-
tion, 48 ALB. L. REv. 343, 373 n.153 (1984); Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug
Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1, 109 (1973).
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and encourage manufacturers to disseminate this information to
the medical profession. 249
Furthermore, because strict liability would increase the price of
inherently dangerous pharmaceutical products, it also would pro-
vide an economic incentive to develop safer alternatives. 20 Theo-
retically, a safer alternative would be cheaper since it would cause
fewer adverse reactions, and thus would generate less liability for
the product seller. In view of the competitive nature of the phar-
maceutical industry,2 1 other manufacturers presumably would be
encouraged by strict liability to develop safer and less expensive
substitutes.
Finally, the allocative efficiency rationale appears to support
the application of strict liability in product design cases. The eco-
nomic incentive provided by strict liability is especially necessary
in the case of combination drugs because marketing advantages,
rather than therapeutic benefits, often lie behind the decision to
combine ingredients into a single product.252
The risk-utility test used in ordinary product design cases ex-
plicitly takes the cost of product injuries into account when the
risks and benefits of existing and alternative designs are weighed
by the court. This protects manufacturers whose design decisions
promote aliocative efficiency but penalizes those who fail to take
the costs of product injuries sufficiently into account when design-
ing their products.
Of course, the courts also weigh risks and benefits when they
apply comment k. However, as mentioned earlier, comment k's
approach is more favorable to product manufacturers than the
risk-utility test in strict liability.253 Because product manufacturers
are more likely to escape liability for improper design when com-
ment k is applied, as compared with the liability standard used in
product design cases, the latter approach is more likely than com-
ment k to encourage cost-effective design decisions.
4. The Loss-Spreading Rationale
Loss-spreading provides yet another rationale for strict prod-
ucts liability. A large number of courts endorse strict liability
241 See Note, Vaccine Related Injuries: Alternatives to the Tort Compensation System,
30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 919, 936 (1986).
2 See Note, supra note 238, at 813.
21' See Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse
Drug Reactions, 48 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 735, 758 n.191 (1979-80).
22 See Comment, sitpra note 187, at 216.
21 See Burke, supra note 206, at 558; EdelI, supra note 205, at 638-46.
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because it shifts the costs of injuries from accident victims to
product sellers, who can spread these costs among product buy-
ers. 254 Loss-spreading is based partly on the notion that those who
benefit from an injury-producing activity should compensate those
who suffer harm. 255 Loss-spreading also may be justified on sec-
ondary accident cost-avoidance grounds. According to this theory,
the "secondary" or dislocation costs of injuries are reduced when
they are spread among a large group of people instead of borne
entirely by individual victims. 6
Loss-spreading generally is most effective if liability for injuries
is placed on the party who can best absorb and spread the cost of
compensation. 25 7 In the case of product-related injuries, product
sellers are usually the best loss-spreaders because they can insure
against such losses28 and treat them as a cost of production.29
Moreover, since product sellers typically sell to a mass market, the
2 See, e.g., Corporate Air Fleet v. Gates Learjet, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1076, 1079
(M.D. Tenn. 1984); Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 123 (Cal. 1985); Immergluck v.
Ridgeview House, Inc., 368 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah 1985).
"I See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 547; Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 186
(Ill. 1965). In the words of Professor Fleming James, "[i]t is both just and expedient that
the enterprise which causes losses should lift them from the individual victims and distribute
them widely among those who benefit from the activities of the enterprise." James, General
Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REv. 923,
924 (1956-57).
Specifically, since pre-market testing cannot reveal all product risks, consumers act as
human "guinea pigs," at least during the first few years after a pharmaceutical product is
marketed. Since future consumers benefit from the information generated by those who use
the product during this period, it seems fair to impose compensation costs on them in the
form of higher prices for the product. See Pratt & Parnon, Diagnosis of a Legal Headache:
Liability for Unforeseeable Defects in Drugs, 53 ST. Jon's L. REv. 517, 538 (1979); Note,
supra note 251, at 757.
2.6 See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 517-18 (1960-61); Kidwell, supra note 214, at 1386.
21 See Ray v. Aad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8 (Cal. 1977); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d
722, 726 (Cal. 1970); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal.
1962); Calabresi, supra note 256, at 517-27; Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the
Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REv.
803, 809-10 (1976).
21 See Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64
MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966); Mallor, Liability Without Fault for Professional Services:
Toward a New Standard of Professional Accountability, 9 SEroN HALL L. REv. 474, 478
(1978).
21 See Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEx. L. REv. 855, 856 (1962-63); Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service
Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661, 691
(1974). But see Britain, supra note 216, at 410 (manufacturer not always the best loss-
spreader).
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incremental cost to each consumer from such price increases is
likely to be small.26
Sellers of pharmaceutical products appear to be good loss-
spreaders.21 The pharmaceutical industry is profitable,2 62 and the
demand for its products is relatively inelastic.2 63 In theory, sellers
of pharmaceutical products, like other product sellers, can obtain
liability insurance and spread the cost of premiums through the
pricing mechanism.264
This reasoning seems especially applicable to risks associated
with the production process. Production flaws in the manufacturing
process are relatively rare and can be accurately predicted by
statistical methods.265 Arguably, production flaws in pharmaceuti-
cal products are similar to manufacturing defects. 266 Consequently,
the loss-spreading arguments that are made with respect to manu-
facturing defects in ordinary products also can be applied to pro-
duction flaws in pharmaceutical products. 267
The loss-spreading rationale also supports strict liability in cases
where consumers are injured as a result of the product manufac-
turer's design choices. In particular, fairness considerations dictate
that producers who make a conscious decision to increase profits
at the expense of consumer safety should be required to compensate
- See Note, Liability of a Manufacturer for Products Defectively Designed by the
Government, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1025, 1080 (1982); Sales, Service-Sales Transactions: A Citadel
Under Assault, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 13, 16 (1978).
-1 See Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1, 88
(1973).
26 See Comment, supra note 187, at 217-18; Note, Comment K Immunity to Strict
Liability: Should All Prescription Drugs Be Protected?, 26 HOUSTON L. Rev. 707, 733
(1989).
263 See Mobilia, supra note 183, at 367.
24 See Connolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent
in His Product, 32 INS. COUNSEL J. 303, 307 (1965).
See McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through
the Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 1,
30 (1978-79).
See Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REv. 398,
409 (1969-70).
2 Contamination of blood by serum hepatitis virus may constitute an exception to
this generalization because the incidence of hepatitis injuries is relatively high. Cf. Note,
supra note 244, at 585 (2% of blood transfusion recipients contract hepatitis); R. Trrmuss,
Tan Gr REIATIONSmp: FROM HumAN BLOOD TO SocIAL POLICY 146 (1971) (3.5% of blood
transfusion recipients contract hepatitis). According to one estimate, the cost of blood would
double if blood suppliers were held strictly liable for injuries caused by contaminated blood.
Note, supra note 24, at 597.
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injured parties, particularly when their design choices are not cost
effective. 218
However, the loss-spreading rationale is less persuasive when it
comes to inherent product risks. Obviously, the imposition of strict
liability for injuries arising from inherent product risks would place
a much greater financial burden on product sellers. 269 Both the
aggregate annual number of adverse drug reactions and the per-
centage of adverse effects from such products are relatively high.270
For example, an estimated 1.3 million serious adverse drug reac-
tions occur annually in the United States.2 71 Another study con-
cluded that 3.6% of all drug exposures result in a serious adverse
reaction. 272 Estimates of the economic costs of adverse drug reac-
tions range from $3 billion to $4.5 billion.273 Sellers of pharmaceu-
tical products may have a difficult time spreading costs of this
magnitude through the pricing mechanism.
Furthermore, even when product risks are relatively low, prod-
uct sellers may be unable to obtain insurance at a reasonable cost.274
Recently, for example, vaccine manufacturers have been unable to
purchase insurance at affordable rates even though the number of
adverse reactions to vaccines was extremely low. 275 In the words of
one commentator, "[t]he presumption in the courts has been that
insurance will solve everything. But it hasn't, because insurance
companies are no more eager to lose their shirts to unpredictably
generous juries than are the vaccine manufacturers themselves." 276
Of course, the product seller has no duty to compensate, even under strict liability,
if the utility of the chosen design outweighs its costs, including the costs of consumer
injuries.
m See McClellan, supra note 265, at 31.
210 Page, supra note 226, at 885-86.
27 See Comment, supra note 187, at 199 n.3.
272 See JICK, The Boston Collaborative Drug Surveillance Programme, in ADvERSE
DRUG REACTIONS 61, 64 (D. Richards & R. Rondel, ed. 1972).
"I See Note, supra note 251, at 737.
2' See Note, Alternatives to Manufacturer Liability for Injuries Caused by the Sabin-
Type Oral Polio Vaccines, 28 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 711, 721-22 (1986-87).
21 See Huber, Safety and Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the Courts, 85 CoLum. L. R y. 277, 287 n.49 (1985) (swine flu vaccine); Note, supra note
262, at 718 n.73 (DTP vaccine). According to one commentator, administration of the oral
polio vaccine causes serious injury about once per 3.2 million doses (5 cases per year); DTP
vaccine also causes serious injury once every 3.2 million doses (43 cases per year). Cases of
anaphylactic shock from all vaccines occur once every ten million doses (10 cases per year).
See Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the
Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. Rv. 149, 149 n.3 (1988). Another commentator
estimates the number of deaths and serious injuries from vaccines at 52 per year. See Note,
supra note 249, at 919.
276 Huber, supra note 275, at 287.
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All of this suggests that loss-spreading may provide less support
for strict liability in inherent risk cases than it does in the case of
other product risks. 277
5. Other Policy Considerations
In addition to the considerations discussed above, a number of
other issues are relevant to the question of whether strict liability
should be imposed on the sellers of pharmaceutical products. In
particular, it is important to assess the administrative costs of
operating a strict liability regime and it also is necessary to evaluate
the effect of strict liability on the price and availability of phar-
maceutical products.
One concern is that the "administrative" or "transaction"
costs of implementing a strict liability regime may be excessive. 278
As Dean Calabresi points out, sometimes it is cheaper to effectuate
societal goals by direct means (specific deterrence) than by relying
on indirect methods (general deterrence), such as the imposition of
tort liability, to achieve them.279 Arguably, the FDA's licensing
process ensures that the social costs and benefits of pharmaceutical
products are properly evaluated. If that is so, the additional ad-
ministrative costs of subjecting pharmaceutical product sellers to
strict liability probably may exceed any marginal improvements in
allocative efficiency that strict liability could achieve.
A second concern is strict liability's potential effect on the
availability and price of pharmaceutical products. A number of
27 This suggests that other loss-spreading mechanisms may be superior to strict liability
for compensating injuries caused by inherent conditions in pharmaceutical products. One
possibility is first-party insurance, like medical or disability insurance, paid for by potential
victims. See Note, Strict Liability for Drug Manufacturers: Public Policy Misconceived, 13
STA. L. Rnv. 645, 648 (1960-61) (victims can obtain low-cost medical insurance to protect
against injury). But see Note, supra note 242, at 151-52 (it is unreasonable to expect
individual consumers to insure against catastrophic loss from drug-related injuries).
Another option is to provide relief to injured parties through government-financed
compensation programs. Congress has authorized such a compensation scheme for certain
vaccine-related injuries. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§
300aa-1 to 300aa-33 (1989); Schwartz & Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 387,
389-93 (1987); Comment, supra note 275, at 157-58. Some foreign countries, such as West
Germany, Sweden and Japan, also provide compensation from public funds to victims of
drug-related injuries. See Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans, 30 AM. J. Con. L.
297, 298-304 (1982).
"I Administrative costs are the costs of operating a particular compensation system,
including litigation costs. See G. CALABRasi, supra note 240, at 28. Dean Calabresi refers
to administrative costs as "tertiary" costs. Id. at 28.
Id. at 102-03.
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commentators have warned that the prospect of strict liability might
cause manufacturers to refrain from marketing risky but otherwise
beneficial productsY 0 In fact, this problem arose in the 1970's
when pharmaceutical companies refused to produce swine flu vac-
cine until the federal government agreed to indemnify them against
tort liability. 28' Fear of excessive tort liability also may cause man-
ufacturers to take useful products off the market. For example,
the producer of Bendectin stopped producing the drug because it
was unable to obtain liability insurance, even though FDA studies
concluded that there was no health reason to withdraw it from the
market. 2 In addition, some firms have abandoned production of
vaccines because of the potential liability associated with such
products.2 8 3
Perhaps these are exceptional cases. In theory, competitive
forces within the industry should ensure a continuing supply of
new pharmaceutical products even if strict liability is imposed on
product sellers.28 4 However, strict liability no doubt will cause
product sellers to subject their products to more extensive testing25
and this will delay the introduction of new drugs into the market.286
These delays carry a social cost, and in some cases, the costs of
delay may exceed the benefits of increased knowledge that are
obtained from additional testing.287
m See Reed & Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case for Federal Action,
63 NEB. L. REv. 389, 438-39 (1984); Comment, The Diminishing Role of Negligence in
Manufacturers' Liability for Unavoidably Unsafe Drugs and Cosmetics, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J.
102, 110 (1977-78); Note, Mass Immunization Cases: Drug Manufacturers' Liability for
Failure to Warn, 29 VA"D. L. Rv. 235, 261 (1976).
21, See Franklin & Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from
the Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 CArt. L. REv. 754, 769 (1977); Huber, supra note 275, at
287 n.49.
See Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL SUD. 645,
648 (1985). But see Comment, supra note 187, at 216-17 (Bendectin should have been taken
off the market because risks of birth defects outweighed its utility as an anti-nausea drug);
Note, supra note 262, at 731 (harmful ingredient in Bendectin did not contribute to the
drug's effectiveness).
2 See Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175, 1204
(1986) (DTP); Huber, supra note 275, at 288-89 (DTP); Comment, Informed Consent to
Immunization: The Risks and Benefits of Individual Autonomy, 65 CAuR. L. Rsv. 1286,
1286 n.2 (1977) (oral polio vaccine).
n, See Note, supra note 251, at 758 (new drugs are necessary to maintain competitive
position within pharmaceutical industry); Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug
Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 947, 1017 (1963-64) (drug manufacturers
need to develop new drugs in order to stay in business).
21 See Merrill, supra note 261, at 113.
'6 See Note, supra note 274, at 721.
23 See Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 341 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Kearl v. Lederle
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Strict liability also could lead to drastic increases in the prices
of pharmaceutical products. Obviously, any additional testing that
resulted from the imposition of strict liability would increase ex-
penses.2 8 In addition, product sellers would try to pass compen-
sation costs on to consumers. 2 9 Competitive forces may counteract
this tendency somewhat. 290 However, as the recent experience with
DTP vaccine illustrates, the threat of increased tort liability some-
times can cause sudden and dramatic increases in the price of
pharmaceutical products. In 1982, manufacturers charged eleven
cents per dose for DTP vaccine; by 1986, the price had risen to
$11.40 per dose. Reportedly, $8.00 of this increase was used to
provide for an insurance reserve against future liability for product-
related injuries. 291
The prospect of substantial price increases for pharmaceutical
products is a disturbing one. To a sick person, drugs are not
luxuries; they are necessities. If the cost of pharmaceutical products
does rise significantly, these products will be placed out of the
reach of many who need them most. 292
C. Absolute Liability and the Duty to Warn
A rule of "absolute" liability would make manufacturers
responsible for all injuries caused by the use of their products. 293
Under this approach, injured parties could recover against prod-
uct sellers merely by establishing that the defendants' products
caused their injuries. The party would not have to prove that
the harm was avoidable or that the product in question was
defective in any way. 294 Although neither courts295 nor
Laboratories, 218 Cal, Rptr. 453, 459 (1985); Feldman, 460 A.2d at 209; Note, Strict
Liability for Drug Manufacturers: Public Policy Misconceived, 13 STAN. L. REV. 645, 649
(1961).
2" See Note, supra note 251, at 755.
28 See Merrill, supra note 261, at 115; Note, Mass Immunization Cases: Drug Manu-
facturers' Liability for Failure to Warn, 29 VAND. L. REV. 235, 261-62 (1976).
See Note, supra note 274, at 736-37.
29 See Note, supra note 262, at 718.
r" See Mobilia, supra note 248, at 367; Note, supra note 233, at 201.
" See Schwartz, supra note 223, at 809.
See Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAIp. L. REv. 435,
441 (1979).
"5 See Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974) ("No one
wants absolute liability where all the article has to do is cause injury."); Morningstar v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 684 (W. Va. 1979) ("We thus decline to adopt
[absolute liability for inherently dangerous but not otherwise defective products] into our
tort product liability law.").
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commentators 296 have shown much enthusiasm for absolute liabil-
ity, it nevertheless remains the most viable alternative to strict
liability and comment k. For this reason, this Article briefly dis-
cusses the potential impact of an absolute liability rule on phar-
maceutical product sellers, with particular emphasis on the duty to
warn.
1. Liability for Inherent Risks and Product Design Choices
Obviously, a shift from strict liability to absolute liability would
increase the liability of product sellers for most product risks. 297
For example, a rule of absolute liability would make product sellers
responsible for all adverse reactions attributable to a product's
inherent biochemical properties. Absolute liability also would im-
pose liability on product sellers for injuries associated with product
design, even though the design chosen was superior to every avail-
able alternative. Finally, under absolute liability, product sellers
would be required to compensate those who were injured by risks
that were scientifically unknowable at the time the product was
sold.
Unless one believes that compensating injured consumers is an
overriding consideration, the case for absolute liability is rather
weak, especially where inherent risks are concerned. Earlier, this
Article concluded that strict liability is inappropriate for injuries
attributable to the inherent nature of a product. The primary
concern was that the cost of compensating for such injuries would
be too great for product sellers to spread effectively through the
pricing mechanism. If this occurred, product sellers would be re-
luctant to market new products and also might raise prices exces-
sively. Since absolute liability would impose even greater costs on
product sellers, this reasoning suggests that it would be even more
undesirable in inherent risk cases.
The argument against absolute liability in product design cases
proceeds along different lines. The earlier discussion of risks as-
sociated with design choices suggested that a rule of strict liability
was preferable to comment k's liability standard. This conclusion
216 See Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964
ILL. L. F. 693, 701 ("No one would be so reckless as to argue that a user can recover
anytime he is injured in the course of the use of a product.").
One exception to this would be risks associated with the production process. Since
product sellers already would be liable for production-related injuries under strict liability,
a rule of absolute liability would not affect producer liability in such cases.
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was based on the assumption that strict liability would encourage
producers to make product design decisions that minimized social
costs. A rule of absolute liability, however, would impose liability
on sellers even when a product is designed properly. If a strict
liability rule is sufficient to achieve allocative efficiency in product
design cases, a rule of absolute liability will not cause product
sellers to allocate resources any better; it will only increase their
liability to consumers. Although this additional liability might allow
more loss-spreading to occur, it also could adversely affect the
availability and price of pharmaceutical products. For these rea-
sons, an absolute liability rule should not be used to resolve product
design cases.
2. The Duty to Warn: Hindsight versus Foresight
One of the most interesting issues in products liability is the
potential impact of an absolute liability rule on a product seller's
duty to warn. Both comment k and strict liability require the
product seller to warn about scientifically discoverable product
risks. An absolute liability rule, on the other hand, would hold a
manufacturer liable for failure to warn even though the risk in-
volved was scientifically unknowable. This approach is commonly
referred to as a "hindsight" rule. Proponents of a hindsight rule
claim that it would ameliorate the plaintiff's burden of proof in
failure to warn cases and also would promote resource allocation
and loss-spreading goals. 298
a. The "Burden of Proof'" Rationale
The New Jersey Supreme Court relied heavily on the "burden
of proof" rationale several years ago when it adopted a hindsight
rule in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.299 In Beshada,
a group of workers sued an asbestos manufacturer, arguing that it
failed to warn them that exposure to asbestos insulation might
m See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 547-49. It also has been suggested that product sellers
should be held liable when reasonable consumer expectations of safety are disappointed by
injuries caused by risks that are scientifically unknowable at the time the product was sold.
See Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment K and for Strict Liability,
58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 853, 889 (1983).
- 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982). The Beshada case was followed in Kisor v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1986), Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 737
F.2d 462, 465 (5th Cir. 1984), and Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo.
1984).
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cause cancer. The defendant, Johns-Manville, contended that the
risk of cancer from asbestos insulation was scientifically unknow-
able when the product in question left its control. According to
the defendant, its duty to warn was confined to risks that were
discoverable by existing knowledge and technology at the time the
product was sold. °° The court, however, disagreed with the defen-
dant and held that the "state of the art" defense was not applicable
to failure to warn claims. 30 1
The Beshada court declared that plaintiffs should not be re-
quired to bear the burden of proof with respect to state of the art
issues. The court felt that plaintiffs would have a difficult time
obtaining evidence on the state of the art and that juries would be
confused by undue focus on this issue. 302 Others also have expressed
doubts about the propriety of requiring plaintiffs to establish what
the state of the art was when the product was sold. 0 3
The Beshada court is no doubt correct that the burden of proof
rationale does support the adoption of a hindsight rule in failure
to warn cases. 3 4 However, if a hindsight rule is rejected for other
reasons, it may be possible to retain the foresight rule, but shift
the burden of persuasion on the state of the art issue to defen-
dants. 305 This approach would meet the requirements of the burden
of proof rationale while retaining many of the benefits of a fore-
sight rule.
b. The Allocative Efficiency Rationale
Advocates of absolute liability also claim that a hindsight rule
would promote an efficient allocation of economic resources. 306
According to this view, the state of the art largely is determined
by an industry's willingness to invest resources in research. 30 An
absolute liability rule will induce product sellers to commit more
Beshada, 447 A.2d at 545-47.
101 Id. at 549.
Id. at 548-49.
"' See Note, New Jersey Advances the State of the Art in Products Liability: Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 15 CoNN. L. REV. 635, 676 (1983); Schwartz, supra note
225, at 693.
3" See Schwartz, supra note 223, at 824-25.
101 See Comment, supra note 214, at 1083; Comment, supra note 216, at 1656-57.
3I Several commentators have evaluated the hindsight rule in terms of economic theory.
See generally Calabresi & Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
585 (1985); Schwartz, supra note 225.
11 See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 548.
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resources to research and thereby advance the frontiers of scientific
knowledge. °0 This, in turn, will lead to discovery and avoidance
of product risks that otherwise would remain undetected until
consumer injuries were reported.
In response, critics of the hindsight approach contend that the
allocative efficiency rationale requires a product seller to invest in
safety research only if it reduces the costs of injuries by more than
the costs of research. 309 If a particular risk is unknown, the amount
of research needed to discover the risk cannot be known in advance
either. Therefore, it will be extremely difficult for a product seller
to estimate how much research is optimal. 310
This argument was raised by Johns-Manville in the Beshada
case. 31 The court, however, declared that liability still should be
imposed on the product seller (in the form of a hindsight rule)
because it was the "cheapest cost avoider. ' 31 2 According to this
theory, when it is difficult or expensive to determine the costs and
benefits of a particular activity, the best way to achieve allocative
efficiency, or at least move in that direction, is to impose liability
on the cheapest cost avoider-that is, the party that is "in the best
position to make a cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and
accident avoidance costs and act on that decision once it is made.) 313
Applying this cheapest cost avoider analysis to pharmaceuticals,
one could argue that product sellers are best able to determine how
much research is cost-effective.
However, the cheapest cost avoider theory implicitly assumes
the existence of someone who can assess costs and benefits with
some degree of accuracy. If we believe that product sellers will be
unable to perform meaningful cost-benefit calculations, there is no
reason to assume that their decisions about research will promote
allocative efficiency. In fact, product sellers may be more likely to
" See Henderson, supra note 220, at 940; Schwartz, Understanding Products Liability,
67 CA .F. L. REv. 435, 484-85 (1979); Comment, Strict Products Liability: The Irrelevance
of Foreseeability and Related Negligence Concepts, 14 TtISA L.J. 338, 353-54 (1978).
' See R. PosNER, supra note 232, at 90-91; Comment, supra note 216, at 1648.
110 See Schwartz, supra note 225, at 696-703. For that matter, it also may be difficult
to determine post hoc how much research was optimal. See Epstein, supra note 283, at
1205.
" See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 548.
112 Id. (quoting Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 406 A.2d 140, 151-52
(N.J. 1979), in turn quoting Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1971-72)).
"' See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
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misallocate economic resources under a hindsight rule than under
a foresight rule. For example, product sellers who are highly risk-
adverse are likely to overinvest in research and testing.31 4 Not only
would this waste corporate resources, but it also would impose
costs on society as the result of delays in the marketing of beneficial
products. 31-
Other product sellers, however, might underinvest in research
if they were subjected to a hindsight rule. 316 In particular, manu-
facturers of existing products might feel that engaging in additional
research would merely turn up evidence of risks that otherwise
would have remained undiscovered. 31 7 Product sellers also might
choose to put their resources into additional liability insurance
(assuming that it could be obtained) instead of investing more
corporate resources into research that ultimately might prove
worthless. 318
Finally, imposition of a hindsight rule could cause market
distortions if product sellers overpriced pharmaceutical products to
cover unknown, but possibly significant, future liability costs. 319
Depending on market conditions, product sellers also might try to
shift some of these anticipated future liability costs on to other
products.320 In either case, the prices charged for pharmaceutical
products would not reflect their true social costs. 321
c. The Loss-Spreading Rationale
According to some commentators, the need to spread losses
fairly dictates that a hindsight rule be applied to sellers of phar-
3" See Henderson, supra note 220, at 942; Comment, supra note 216, at 1648-49.
311 See Comment, supra note 216, at 1649; Note, supra note 274, at 721.
336 See Henderson, supra note 220, at 940-41.
"I See Note, Strict Liability in Tort-State-of-the-Art Defense Inapplicable in Design
Defect Cases, 13 SEToN HALL L. REv. 625, 638 (1982-83); Berry, Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp.: Revolution-or Aberration-in Products Liability Law, 52 FORDHAM L.
REv. 786, 797 (1984); Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable
Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 734, 755 (1983). On the other hand, this disincentive
is somewhat offset by the fact that others may be generating information as well. See
Schwartz, supra note 308, at 485.
"I See Comment, Defeat for the State-of-the-Art Defense in New Jersey Product
Liability: Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 14 RUTGERS L.J. 953, 974 (1983).
319 See Note, supra note 317, at 637.
" See Berry, supra note 317, at 794; Henderson, supra note 220, at 943.
311 But see Page, supra note 226, at 878-79 (market distortions are more likely to occur
under noncompetitive market conditions than in a competitive market environment).
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maceutical products.32 They claim that the number of injuries from
undiscovered risks is small in relation to the number of injuries
from known risks. 323 Consequently, proponents of the hindsight
rule maintain that product sellers can obtain liability insurance
easily and thereby spread the costs of compensating those injured
as the result of unknown product risks. 324
However, this view has been vigorously challenged by other
commentators. 325 They point out that liability insurers often over-
estimate the consequences of unknown risks.326 Therefore, insurers
may be unwilling to insure against such liability arising out of
undiscovered product risks,327 or they may charge unreasonably
high premiums for adequate coverage against such liability.321
D. A Proposed Rule for "Unavoidably Unsafe" Products
Presently, the liability of pharmaceutical products sellers is
largely governed by the provisions of comment k. However, com-
ment k's language and structure leave much to be desired. For
example, it is unclear whether comment k can be properly applied
to products that are technologically capable of being made safer
or whether the term "unavoidably unsafe" should be taken liter-
ally.329 The language of comment k is also vague about the extent
of its coverage. In particular, it is unclear whether the drafters of
comment k intended to restrict its application to pharmaceutical
112 See Note, The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case Study of Manufacturers'
Liability Without Fault in Tort and Warranty, 65 YALE L.J. 262, 264 (1955-56).
I" See Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform: Comment on Calabresi and
Klevorick, 14 J. LEGAL STruD. 633, 637 (1985); Note, supra note 242, at 145.
'11 See Wade, supra note 197, at 826.
321 See Henderson, supra note 220, at 949; Note, New Jersey Advances the State of
the Art in Products Liability: Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 15 CoNN. L. Rv.
661, 679 (1982-83); Note, supra note 251, at 757.
316 See Note, Tort Liability for DPT Vaccine Injury and the Preemption Doctrine, 22
IND. L. Ray. 655, 673-74 (1989).
327 See Henderson, supra note 220, at 949; Note, supra note 318, at 974.
31, See Comment, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: Adding Uncertainty to
Injury, 35 RtrrcEas L. REV. 982, 1011 (1983).
329 Most courts seem willing to apply comment k to product risks that are not literally
unavoidable. For example, virtually every court has absolved blood suppliers from liability
for injuries caused by serum hepatitis in blood even though the risk of serum hepatitis
contamination can be significantly reduced by improved screening procedures. See supra
notes 78-107 and accompanying text. A number of courts also have applied comment k to
product risks caused by conscious design choices. See supra notes 131-65 and accompanying
text.
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products or whether they believed that comment k should protect
any seller whose product was incapable of being made safe.330
Furthermore, there is considerable disagreement about the proper
role, if any, that comment k should play in the law of products
liability. Generally, courts have applied comment k rather gener-
ously, at least as far as pharmaceutical products are concerned.13'
At the same time, however, some courts have exhibited a certain
amount of hostility to the concept of comment k and have pro-
posed that it be replaced with the risk-utility standard that is
employed currently in product design cases. 3 2
Considering comment k's obvious flaws, it is surprising that
the American Law Institute has made no effort to rewrite the
provision since its adoption in 1963. The only serious alternative
treatment of the unavoidably unsafe product issue is section 105
of the Department of Commerce's Model Uniform Product Lia-
bility Act. 333 Section 105, entitled "Unavoidably Dangerous Aspects
of Products," provides that sellers will not be held strictly liable
for the unavoidably unsafe aspects of their products as long as
they provide adequate warnings. 334
Although section 105 is better drafted than comment k, its
substantive provisions are essentially the same.335 Section 105 de-
fines an unavoidably unsafe product as one that cannot be made
safe because of current technological limitations. In effect, it ex-
"' See supra notes 42-75 and accompanying text.
"' For example, some courts have held that comment k applies across-the-board to all
prescription drugs. See id.
"1 See Brochu, 642 F.2d at 655; Finn, 677 P.2d at 1166-67 (Bird, C.J., dissenting);
Murphy, 710 P.2d at 262 (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath,
722 P.2d 410, 414 (Colo. 1986).
133 See MODEL Urnroiu PRODUCT Li.rry ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714
(Dept. of Commerce offered Oct. 31, 1979).
314 Section 105 declares:
(a) An unavoidably unsafe aspect of a product is that aspect incapable of
being made safe in light of the state of scientific and technological knowledge
at the time of manufacture.
(b) A product seller may be subject to liability for failing to provide an
adequate warning or instruction about an unavoidably unsafe aspect of the
seller's product, if the factors set forth in Section 104, subdivision (C) indicate
that such warnings or instructions should have been given. This obligation to
warn or instruct may arise after the time the product is manufactured.
(c) If Section 104(C) is not applicable, the product seller shall not be subject
to liability for harm caused by an unavoidably unsafe aspect of a product
unless the seller expressly warranted by words or actions that the product is
free of such unsafe aspects.
"335 See Page, supra note 226.
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empts from strict liability: (1) products whose risks arise out of
the production process if these risks are technologically unavoida-
ble; (2) products with inherent risks; and (3) products whose risks
are scientifically undiscoverable at the time of marketing.3 3 6
Like comment k, section 105 places losses from unavoidable
product risks on consumers rather than on product sellers. As the
commentary to section 105 points out, "[tihe approach taken in
Section 105 recognizes that there may be circumstances where a
seriously injured person is left without compensation for an injury
caused by an unavoidably unsafe aspect of a product. 33 7 The
commentary also declares, "[i]f the costs of these harms are to be
shifted from the individual, they should be borne by society at
large.' '338
The policies discussed earlier in this article support some limi-
tations on strict liability for pharmaceutical product sellers. How-
ever, I would propose a somewhat narrower exemption than either
comment k or section 105 provide. My proposal3 39 would read as
follows:
(1) The sellers of a chemical drug, biologic, or medical device
licensed by the federal Food and Drug Administration for sale by
prescription shall not be subject to liability for harm caused by an
unavoidable product risk unless the seller has expressly warranted
by words or actions that the product is free from such risk.
(2) An unavoidable product risk is one that is solely attributable
to the product's inherent physical, chemical, or biological condition
and that is incapable, under existing or reasonably achievable tech-
nology, of being reduced or eliminated. A product risk also shall
be regarded as unavoidable if, at the time the product was mar-
keted, the risk was unknown to the scientific community and could
316 The comment to § 105 clearly extends the duty to warn only to scientifically
knowable risks. The comment states that:
The factual question underlying the legal issue of whether warnings or instruc-
tions were adequate is whether product sellers meet their duty to promulgate
warnings and instructions commensurate with their actual knowledge gained
from research and adverse reaction reports and their constructive knowledge
as measured by scientific literature and other available means of communica-
tion.
See 44 Fed. Reg. 3006 (Jan. 12, 1979) (emphasis in original).
337 Id.
33' Id.
,39 Although this proposal is drafted in "legislative" form, this Article is not necessarily
recommending that the American Law Institute substitute it in place of comment k's existing
language. The substance of the proposal just as easily could take the form of a judicial
gloss on the common law doctrine of strict liability in tort.
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not have been discovered by the application of existing, or reason-
ably achievable, scientific knowledge or technology. The product
seller who alleges that a product risk is unavoidable shall have the
burden of establishing this allegation by a preponderance of the
evidence.
(3) A product seller may be subject to liability for failing to
provide an adequate warning or instruction about a known una-
voidable product risk or about a product risk that could be dis-
covered by the application of existing, or reasonably achievable,
scientific knowledge or technology.
There are four significant aspects to this proposal. First, it
focuses on unavoidable product risks, rather than attempting to
characterize the product itself as unavoidably unsafe. Second, it is
limited to pharmaceutical products licensed by the FDA. Third,
only inherent and unavoidable product risks are immunized from
strict liability. Finally, scientifically unknowable risks are treated
as if they were unavoidable.
The proposal is similar to section 105 in that it focuses on the
unavoidably unsafe aspects of a product rather than attempting,
like comment k, to classify the product itself as unavoidably un-
safe. This approach is preferable because it avoids placing undue
emphasis on the product's overall risks and benefits and instead
directs attention to the specific risk involved. By concentrating on
a particular product risk, this approach also makes it easier for
courts to confine the unavoidable risk rule to product risks that
are truly unavoidable.
This proposal also limits the exemption from strict liability to
pharmaceutical products licensed by the FDA for sale by prescrip-
tion. The proposal is narrower in this respect than comment k
because nonpharmaceutical products are clearly excluded from cov-
erage, as are "over the counter" drugs. One could argue that
unavoidable risks should be treated the same, regardless of the
product. While there is some merit to this position, special protec-
tion is warranted for FDA-approved pharmaceutical products be-
cause of their high social utility and because of legitimate concerns
about the effect of excessive tort liability on the price and availa-
bility of such products. Possibly, these same concerns apply to
certain other products as well. However, if this is the case, similar
protection against liability can be provided for such products.
It should be noted that this proposal avoids any explicit bal-
ancing of risks and benefits. This omission seems appropriate in
the case of pharmaceutical products because risks and benefits are
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already evaluated by the FDA as part of the licensing process.
Once the FDA has determined that a product's therapeutic benefits
outweigh its known inherent risks, it serves no purpose for courts
to engage in a similar endeavor. 340
Furthermore, this proposal would insulate only inherent and
unavoidable product risks from liability. As mentioned earlier,
comment k supposedly is limited to unavoidable danger, but as a
practical matter, the courts have extended its provisions to product
risks that are not truly unavoidable. For example, comment k has
been applied to production flaws, such as contaminated blood, on
the theory that such conditions are unavoidable. Some courts have
also applied comment k to risks resulting from conscious design
choices by product sellers. By restricting protection to inherent
conditions, my proposal excludes virtually all production flaws
since the product risk would be artificial, rather than being part
of the product's inherent nature. It also excludes risks created by
design choice since these risks are not unavoidable. 341
Finally, my proposal creates an exception from strict liability
for scientifically unknowable risks. As concluded earlier, holding
product sellers liable for scientifically unknowable risks under a
failure to warn theory is contrary to many of the policies that
underlie strict products liability. Consequently, like comment k,
this proposal treats scientifically unknowable risks as if they were
unavoidable. Still, recognizing that injured consumers are unlikely
to be able to prove that a risk was scientifically knowable at a
particular time, this proposal shifts the burden of persuasion on
the "knowability" or "state of the art" issue to the product seller,
who is more likely to be able to offer expert testimony on this
issue.3 42
Perhaps the issue of scientifically unknowable risks should be
treated separately from the issue of known unavoidable product
risks. 343 However, most courts have considered that lack of know-
"' See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoLtr. L. Rv. 1531, 1555-56 (1973) (arguing that administrative
agencies often are better suited than courts to make, or evaluate, polycentric decisions).
34 These risks, of course, would be treated like any other risk that arises out of a
conscious design choice by the product seller.
342 See Comment, supra note 214, at 1083; Note, supra note 325, at 677; Comment,
supra note 216, at 1656-57.
41 See Note, Strict Liability and the Scientifically Unknowable Risk, 57 MARQ. L.
REv. 660, 661 (1973-74) (discussing the difference between scientifically unknowable risks
and risks that are known, but physically unavoidable).
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ledge prior to marketing makes a product just as unavoidably
unsafe as any inherent aspect of its physical, chemical, or biological
condition. Consequently, despite some misgivings, this proposal
adopts a similar approach.
CONCLUSION
Comment k exempts sellers of unavoidably unsafe products
from the normal rules of strict products liability. Because the
language of comment k is ambiguous in many respects, the courts
have not always agreed on its proper purpose or scope. Most
courts, however, have concluded that comment k is applicable
primarily to risks associated with pharmaceutical products. These
risks include (1) risks attributable to some mishap in the production
process, (2) risks arising from the inherent nature of a product,
(3) risks created by conscious design choices, and (4) scientifically
unknowable risks.
Earlier, this Article described the various rationales that courts
and commentators have traditionally relied on to justify the im-
position of strict liability on product sellers. These rationales also
seem applicable to at least some of the risks associated with phar-
maceutical products. In certain cases, however, these rationales are
much less persuasive, or they are outweighed by countervailing
considerations.
This Article proposes an alternative to comment k that, if
accepted by the courts, would protect sellers from liability for
unavoidable risks that arise from the inherent nature of pharma-
ceutical products. It also advocates that product sellers be insulated
from liability for scientifically unknowable risks. On the other
hand, this proposal would remove the protection, currently af-
forded by comment k in certain cases, against liability for risks
associated with the production process and for risks created by
conscious design choices.
Allocating risks between product sellers and their potential
victims is a difficult task. Hopefully, this proposal gives appropri-
ate recognition to the interests of both producers and consumers
of pharmaceutical products.
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